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Recent Cases
CHATTEL MORTGAGEs-AuToMOBILES-NOTATION

ON CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

Butler County Fiwance Co. v. Prince'
0, through used car dealer S, sold his automobile to B, the latter executing his
promissory note secured by chattel mortgage on said car to S, in payment of the
purchase price thereof. The mortgage was recorded in the county where B resided. The existence of such mortgage was not shown on the certificate of title.
Subsequently S endorsed the note and transferred the mortgage to P. B sold the
car to D, a purchaser for value without actual notice of the mortgage-its existence
not appearing on the certificate of title when given to him, and likewise not appear-

ing on the new certificate thereafter issued to him. After default by B on the payments, P brought a replevin action against D for the automobile. Judgment for
plaintiff, the court holding that it was not necessary, in the case of a used car, to
note the existence of a purchase-money mortgage on the certificate of title as provided for by Missouri Revised Statutes § 3488 (1939)2 in order to give notice to a
subsequent bona fide purchaser. Recordation in the county of the mortgagor's residence, as provided for by Missouri Revised Statutes § 3486 (1939)3, was deemed
sufficient to give constructive notice of the mortgage so as to sustain the mortgagee's
rights as against the subsequent bona fide purchaser.
Missouri's general chattel mortgage recordation statute4 in substance provides
that where the mortgagor retains possession the mortgage must be recorded or filed
in the county of the mortgagor's residence, or. in the county where the property was
situated at the time of the transaction in the case of a non-resident mortgagor, in
order to give constructive notice of the mortgage to subsequent parties. This statute
has, until recent years, been fairly satisfactory in determining the respective rights
of bona fide purchasers and mortgagees where there has been a fraudulent sale of
mortgaged property. In today's highly mobile civilization, however, the rights of
a bona fide purchaser. rest on a precarious foundation under such a statute. Even in
the case of refrigerators, household furniture, and like chattels residences today are
often of such transitory and impermanent nature that a purchaser who wishes to be
sure he is receiving an unencumbered title might conceivably have to search records
in numerous distant parts of the country. Even then he might still be in doubt,
depending on the accuracy and extent of the information which the seller gave
him. This truth becomes even more self-evident in the sale of automobiles because:
1. They are capable of rapid and easy movement to, and sale in, other areas of
the state or nation.
1.
2.
3.
4.

231 S.W. 2d 834 (Mo. App. 1950).
Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.480 (1949).
Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 443.460 (1949).
Ibid.
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2. The certificate of title to an automobile purports to show the present
status of said title.
Probably for the above reasons the Missouri legislature in 1939 passed a
statute5 which apparently had as its purpose the protection of subsequent purchasers of mortgaged motor vehicles. In substance the statute provided that a
mortgage on a motor vehicle should not be notice to the whole world unless its existence was noted on the certificate of title. This would seem to set forth a requirement other than and in addition to that of recordation. In the same statute certain exceptions were provided to which the statute was not to apply. In these exceptional situations recordation would thus be sufficient to give constructive notice.
It is the scope of the proviso of the statute embodying the exceptions which has
occasioned litigation. The pertinent part of the statute as it appeared in the session laws of 1939 and as it was printed in the revised statutes of 1939 appears below:
Missouri Laws 1939, p. 278:
"Sec. 3097A. Recorder to certify filing
of chattel mortgage-fee.-It shall be
the duty of the recorder of deeds, on
request of the mortgagee, or his assignee, to certify on the certificate of
title to the mortgaged motor vehicle,
that such chattel mortgage has been
filed showing the date, the amount of
the mortgage and the name of the
payee. When such chattel mortgage is
released it shall be the duty of the
recorder to so show on the certificate
of title. . . . A mortgage on a motor
vehicle shall not be notice to the
whole world, unless the record thereof
is noted on the certificate of title to
the mortgaged motor vehicle, as herein
provided. Provided, however, that the
provisions of this section shall not apply to chattel mortgages given to secure the purchase price of any part
thereof or to a mrotor vehicle sold by
the manufacturer or their distributing
dealers, or to a chattel mortgage given
by dealers to secure loans on the floor
plan stock of motor vehicles."

Missouri Revised Statutes §

3488

(1939):
"Sec. 3488. Recorder to certify filing
of chattel mortgage-fee.-It shall be
the duty of the recorder of deeds, on
request of the mortgagee, or his assignee, to certify on the certificate of
title to the mortgaged motor vehicle,
that such chattel mortgage has been
filed showing the date, the amount of
the mortgage and the name of the
payee. When such chattel mortgage is
released it shall be the duty of the
recorder to so show on the certificate
of title. .

.

. A mortgage on a motor

vehicle shall not be notice to the
whole world, unless the record thereof
is noted on the certificate of title to
the mortgaged motor vehicle, as herein
provided: Provided, however, that
the provisions of this section shall not
apply to chattel mortgages given to secure the .urchase price of a motor vehicle sold by the manufacturer or their
distributing dealers, or to a chattel
mortgage given by dealers to secure
loans on the floor plan stock of motor
vehicles."

6
The session laws version, szcpra (left) was erroneously printed. This is the

form of the house bill as originally introduced.7 There was, however, a Senatd
5. Mo. Laws 1939, p. 278. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 3488 (1939).
6. See House Journal, Senate Journal, Missouri (60th General Assembly,
(1939) and bill as signed by Gov. Stark on July 8, 1939 on file in Secretary of
State's Office.
7. House Bill No. 546 -60th General Assembly, 1939). The Original version
may have had severa typographical errors. It may have been meant to read:
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss2/4
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amendment thereto, which became a part of the bill as finally passed.8 The correct
version, which includes the Senate amendment, appeared in the Revised Statutes,
supra (right). Apparently basing their decision upon the correct version as set out
in the Revised Statutes (though the point is not free from doubt), the Springfield
Court of Appeals held, in Interstate Securities Co. v. Barton0 that the exceptions

applied to new cars.'0 From this interpretation, it would seem that there were two
exceptions:
1. Chattel mortgages given to secure the purchase price of a new motor vehicle sold by the manufacturer or their distributing dealers.
2. Chattel mortgages given by dealers to secure loans on the floor plan stock
of motor vehicles.
In 1941, however, the statute was repealed and reenacted to make the exceptions read as they do today:
" .... Provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not
apply to chattel mortgages given to secure the purchase price or any part
thereof or to a motor vehicle sold by the manufacturer or. their distributing
dealers, or to a chattel mortgage given by dealers to secure loans on the
floor plan stock of motor vehicles." "L
It will be noted that the wording of this amendment, with the exception of changing "of" to "or" immediately before the words "any part thereof" (an apparent
typographical error), is exactly the same as that of the proviso erroneously printed
in the session laws of 1939. It may well be then that the legislature thought that
in passing the 1941 amendment it was correcting an error on the part of the revision committee in compiling the Revised Statutes of 1939, and in addition correcting a typographical error in the session laws of 1939.12 On the other hand, the
1941 amendment embodies the language of the 1939 house bill prior to the Senate
amendment thereto, so the true intent of the 1941 amendment remains obscure.' 3
What may have been its purpose will probably remain in doubt. In Butler County
Finance Co. v. Miller," the court gives an elaborate analysis of the history of the
section. However the analysis is faulty in that the court (quite reasonably) assumed the version in the 1939 session laws was correct and the version in Missouri
Revised Statutes (1939) was erroneous.

With the exception of a minor change concerning recorder's fees, made in
1947,15 the statute is the same today' 6 as it was following the 1941 amendment. In
"Provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to chattel
mortgages given to secure the purchase price or (for of) any part thereof of (for
or to) a motor vehicle sold by the manufacturer" etc.
8. See note 6, supra.
9. 236 Mo. App. 325, 153 S.W. 2d 393 (1941).
10. Id. at 332, 153 S.W. 2d at 396.
11. Mo. Laws 1941, p. 327.
12. See notes 6 and 7, supra.
13. See Note 7, supra.
14. 225 S.W. 2d 135, 136 (Mo. App. 1949).
15. Mo. Laws 1947, V. II, p. 220.
16. Mo. REv. STATS. § 443.480 (1949).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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this present form the exceptions of the statute have been interpreted to apply to
any purchase-money chattel mortgage on an automobile, by whomsoever given,
whether the car is new or used.' 7 Apparently, then, the present interpretation is
that the statute includes three exceptions:
1. Any purchase-money chattel mortgage on any automobile.
2. A chattel mortgage on an automobile sold by the manufacturer or their
distributing dealers.
3. A chattel mortgage given by dealers to secure loans on the floor plan stock.
There may be some basis for questioning the courts' interpretation of the
statute as including all purchase-money mortgages. If the proviso of the statute
were intended to except any purchase-money mortgage on any automobile, it is
difficult to understand why clear language to this effect was not used in the statute
instead of allowing the second exception to remain a part of the statute. Further,
there is a grammatical deficiency in the structure of the sentence. If what had
originally been one exception was intended to be converted to two distinct exceptions by the 1941 amendment, why is there no phrase available for "the purchase
price or any part thereof" to refer to, other than "a motor vehicle sold by the manufacturer or their distributing dealers"?18 At least a comma might have been placed
between exceptions one and two (if two exceptions were intended), as was done
between exceptions two and three.
There is, however, considerable justification for the courts' present interpretation of the statute in view of the 1941 amendment. Considering the apparent contradiction between the courts' present interpretation and the statute's probable
original purpose, plus the doubtful intent of the 1941 amendment, it would seem
some legislative clarification of the statute is desirable.
There should be no question as to the wisdom of the floor plan exception, or
of the dealers' sales' exception, as applied to 'new cars, on either a legal or practical
basis, since it is generally held that a dealer has power to pass an unencumbered title,
if the sale is made in the usual course of business to a bona fide purchaser, on a
theory of either apparent authority or estoppel.'1 Thus in this situation there is no
need for special legislation to protect the bona fide purchaser. On the other hand,
as a practical matter, the dealer has no certificate of title to a new car, but merely
17. Butler County Finance Co. v. Miller, siprta n. 14, 225 S.W. 2d at 137;
Butler County Finance Co. v. Prince, sUpra n. 1, 231 S.W. 2d at 836. (In the
Prince case some emphasis was given to the fact that recordation of the mortgage
preceded issuance of the certificate of title. Neither this fact nor the fact that the
language of the statute does not make notation by the recorder absolutely mandatory seem to the writer to be controlling. The essential question is whether the
mortgage be noted on the certificate of title, and if it be not, then whether the
transaction comes within one of the exceptions in the statute.) See also: Goodrich
Silvertown Stores of B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Brashear Freight Lines, Inc., 198 S.W.
2d 357 (Mo. App. 1946) (statute does not apply to mortgages on tires and tubes);
Burtrum Bros. Motor Co. v. Dryden, 38 So. 2d 88 (La. 1948).
18. This phase, in Interstate Securities Co. v. Barton, supra n. 9, held to apply
to new cars.
19. Comment, 12 Mo. L. REV. 189 (1947).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss2/4
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issues a bill of sale therefor, and the purchaser must apply to the Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles for a certificate.20 There is thus no certificate of title on which
the dealer can cause the notation of the mortgage to be placed in the case of a
new car. The dealer can fully protect himself or his assignee however, if he takes
a purchase-money mortgage on a new car, by showing the mortgage on the bill of
sale, which must be sent to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles in order for the
purchaser to receive his certificate of title. If this be done, then the mortgage
will also appear on the certificate of title. It is believed that in the case of a
dealer's sale of a new car, a purchase-money mortgage being taken at the time of
the sale, a subsequent bona fide purchaser should be protected unless the original
certificate of title carries a notation as to the mortgage, or unless the dealer has
the recorder make such a notation on the certificate of title.
Conceding that the courts' interpretation of the statute is justified, it is highly
doubtful if the intent of the legislature accords with the courts' interpretation as
applied to .sed cars. Assuming the general purpose of the statute is to protect
bona fide purchasers of mortgaged automobiles, was it the legislature's intent to
protect them in the case of a mortgage given as security for a loan, and then to
withhold that protection when a purchase-money mortgage was given? The writer
can find no logical grounds for believing this distinction was intended by the legislature.
In order to dispel the confusion surrounding the language, purpose and scope
of the statute, it is suggested that the legislature take action to remove both the
hidden and apparent ambiguities therein, by amending the statute to conform with
either the court's interpretation in the Miller and Prince cases, supra, or as per the
court's interpretation in the Barton case, supra.
Considerable reason in favor of the latter course of action exists. First, it was
and still appears to be the general purpose of the statute to protect bona fide purchasers. Second, it is the general custom among prospective purchasers to regard
the certificate of title as safe evidence of the status of the title itself without inquiring further, and there are practical business reasons for maintaining the validity
of that assumption. Third, the interests of the mortgagee-seller, or his assignee,
are not prejudiced by such a result because there is no reason, in the case of used
cars, other than the mortgagee-seller's own negligence, for the notation failing to
appear on the certificate of title.
Roy W. McGHEE, JR.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-RECOGNITION OF A FOREIGN CHATTEL MORTGAGE
Bank of Atlanta v. F-retz1
One Harris executed a chattel mortgage on an automobile in favor of the
plaintiff bank in Georgia. This mortgage was duly filed for record in compliance
20. Mo. REv. STAT. § 301.200 (1949).
1. 226 S.W. 2d 843 (Tex. 1950).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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with the laws of Georgia. At the time, Harris was a resident of Georgia and the
automobile was located in that state. Thereafter, without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, Harris removed the automobile to Texas and applied for a
certificfate of title fraudulently representing that there was no liens existing against
said automobile. On the same day, Harris sold the automobile to defendant Fretz
for valuable consideration and Harris executed an assignment of the application
for a certificate of title to Fretz. At the time of his purchase of the automobile,
Fretz had no actual knowledge of the fact that it was then subject to the chattel
mortgage lien held by the plaintiff bank. The mortgage was not recorded in Texas.
No certificate of title act was in force in Georgia. Fretz, in turn, sold the automobile
to Sweiven, for value, who had no actual knowledge that the autombile was subject to a chattel mortgage. Plaintiff learned of the removal and brought suit in
Texas to foreclose its mortgage, joining as defendants, Harris, Fretz and Sweiven.
The trial court and the court of civic appeals gave judgment for defendants.
Plantiff then appealed to the supreme court which reversed the judgment -for defendant and gave judgment for the plaintiff. Held: a valid mortgage lien recorded
in the state where mortgage was given is enforceable in Texas against an automobile
in the hands of an innocent purchaser for value without knowledge of lien. It is
immaterial that the mortgage was not noted on the Texas certificate of title or that
the foreign state had no certificate of title act.
This case is of interest to Missouri lawyers in that it overrules Consolidated
Garage Co. v. Chambers,2 which held that a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice took free of a chattel mortgage duly recorded in another state but not recorded in Texas. The court, in the Chambers case, protected the purchaser in Texas
regardless of the fact that the automobile was removed from the foreign state without knowledge or consent of the mortgagee. The doctrine announced in the
Chambers case had become known as the "Texas doctrine" and had made Texas
a mecca for the sale of stolen automobiles. In the instant case, the Supreme Court
of Texas overruled the Chambers case and adopted the majority viewpoint.
By the great weight of authority, the state to which the chattel is removed will
recognize the validity of a foreign mortgage properly recorded in the foreign state.3
Missouri follows the majority doctrine.4 Recognition of the foreign chattel mortgage
2. 111 Tex. 293, 231 S.W. 1072 (1921).
3. Hoyt v. Zibell, 259 Fed. 186, 187 (7th Cir. 1919); Shapard v. Hynes, 104
Fed. 449, 452 (8th Cir. 1900); Hinton v. Bond Discount Co., 214 Ark. 718, 218
S.W. 2d 75, 77 (1949); First National Bank of Nevada v. Swegler, 336 Ill. App.
107, 82 N.E. 2d 920, 921 (1948); First National Bank of Ellsworth v. Ripley, 204
Ia. 590, 215 N.W. 647, 649 (1927); Citizens State Bank v. Farmers Union Livestock
Co-op, 165 Kan. 96, 193 P. 2d 636, 639 (1948); Green Finance Co. v. Becker, 151
Neb. 479, 37 N.W. 2d 794, 797 (1949); 2 BEALE, CONFLICr' OF LAWS § 268.2
p. 997 (1935); REsTATEmENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS § 268 (1934); 10 AM. J.
p. 729 § 21; 14 C.J.S. p. 607, § 15; see Note, 13 A.L.R. 2d 1318 (1950).
4. National Bank of Commerce v. Morris, 114 Mo. 255, 21 S.W. 511, 513
(1893); Morris Plan Co. of Kan. v. Jenkins, 216 S.W. 2d 160, 164 (1948); Wisdom
v. Keithly, 237 Mo. App. 76, 167 S.W. 2d 450, 456 (1943); Yellow Mgf. Acceptance
Corp. v. Rogers, 235 Mo. App. 96, 142 S.W. 2d 888, 892 (1940); Steckel v. Swift, 56
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss2/4
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is based on comity.5 One state, Wyoming, has held that comity implies reciprocity
and refused to recognize a Texas mortgage when Texas would not recognize a
Wyoming mortgage. 6 However, there is much authority to the contrary, holding
that the local state will recognize the validity of the foreign mortgage even though
the foreign state would not recognize the validity of a local mortgage.7 The general
rule does not seem to be affected by the local certificate of title act requiring a notation of mortgage on the certificate, provided the lien is valid in the foreign state
where the mortgage was given.8 It is essential, however, that the mortgage be a
valid one in the state where given. 9 There is a difference of opinion as to whether
the mortgagee's consent to or acquisence in the removal of the property affects the
general rule. The greater weight of authority says that the general rule does not
apply where the mortgagee consented to or acquiesed in the removal, and the
mortgagee must re-record the mortgage in the state into which the property is removed. 10 Missouri follows this rule." However, the removal consented to must be
2
permanent and not temporary or intermittent for short periods only.'
A minority of the states refuse to recognize the validity of a foreign mortgage.
In these states, the record of a chattel mortgage in another state is not constructive
notice to a creditor of or a subsequent purchaser from the mortgagor.' 8 They apply
the rule regardless of the fact that the property was removed without the consent or
S.W. 2d 806, 808 (1933); Metzger v. Columbia Terminal Co., 227 Mo. App. 135, 50
S.W. 2d 680, 682 (1932); Adamson v. Fogelstrom, 221 Mo. App. 1243, 300 S.W. 841,
844 (1927); Finance Service Corp. v. Kelly, 235 S.W. 146, 147 (1921); Geiser Mfg.
Co. v. Todd, 224 S.W. 1006 (1920); Hollipiter-Shonyo & Co. v. Maxwell, 205 Mo.
App. 357, 225 S.W. 113, 114 (1920).
5. Hoyt v. Zibell, 259 Fed. 186, 187 (7th Cir. 1919); Metzger v. Columbia
Terminals Co. 227 Mo. App. 135, 50 S.W. 2d 680, 682 (1932).
6. Union Securities Co. v. Adams, 33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac. 513, $17 (1925).
7. Hinton v. Bond Discount Co., 214 Ark. 718, 218 S.W. 2d 75 (1949), recognized a Texas mortgage; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Nuss, 195 La. 209,
196 So. 323 (1940), recognized a Missouri mortgage; Hart v. Oliver Farm Equipmeit Sales Co., 97 N. M. 267, 21 P. 2d 96 (1933), recognized a Texas mortgage.
8. Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz, supra n. 1. See Note, 13 A.L.R. 2d 1326 (1950).
9. Burtrum Bros. Motor Co. v. Dryden, 38 So. 2d 88 (La. 1948), certificate of title issued in Missouri did not have notation theron of the mortgage
as required by Missouri statute; Morris Plan Co. of Kan. v. Jenkins, 216 S.W. 2d
160, 164 (1948), mortgaged property was not in Oklahoma at the time of the execution of the mortgage in that state; Great Amercian Indemnity Co. v. Utility Contractors, 21 Tenn. App. 478, 111 S.W. 2d 901, 909 (1937), defective acknowledgement.
10. Mercantile Acceptance Co. v. Frank, 203 Cal. 483, 265 Pac. 190 194
(1928); Moore v. Keystone Driller Co., 30 Idaho 220, 163 Pac. 1114 (19175; 14
C.J.S. p. 609, § 15.
11. Adamson v. Fogelstrom, 221 Mo. App. 1243, 300 S.W. 841, 844 (1927);
Geiser Mfg. Co. v. Todd, 224 S.W. 1006, 1008 (1920); Hollipiter-Shonyo & Co. v.
Maxwell, 205 Mo. App. 357, 224 S.W. 113, 114 (1920).
12. Flora v. Julesburg Motor Co., 69 Colo. 238, ,193 Pac. 545, $46 (1920); Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp. v. Rogers, 235 Mo. App. 96, 142 S.W. 2d 888, 892
(1940); P. R. Smith Motor Sales v. Lay, 179 Va. 117. 3 S.E. 2d 190, 191 (1939).
13. Lee v. Bank of Georgia, 1$9 Fla. 481, 32 So. 2d 7 (1947); see note, 13
A.L.R. 2d 1306 (1950); First National Bank v. Sheldon, 161 Pa. Super. 265, 54 A.
2d 61, 63 (1947).
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knowledge of the mortgagee. Some states have statutes which expressly require that

foreign mortgages must be re-recorded in the local state to which the property is
removed.' 4

The adoption by the Supreme Court of Texas of the majority rule, protection
of the mortgagee under a valid foreign mortgage, is an important step toward preventing the sale of stolen automobiles in Texas.
MONTGOMERY L. WILSON

CORPORATIONS-STOcK TRANSFER--OPFN PENALTY BOND
Chemical Bank and Trust Co. v. Antkeuser-Biusdc1
On June 26, 1925, appellant, Anheuser-Busch, Incorporated, issued to Walter
Reisinger a certificate numbered 33 representing shares of stock. At the time of
the trial the 18,750 shares were worth $375,000.00.
In December, 1932, Mr. Reisinger informed the directors that certificate #33,
registered in his name, had been lost and could not be found, and that the certificate had not been endorsed by him. Mr. Reisinger then requested the issuance
to him of a new certificate representing the same number of shares. In support
of his request he tendered a bond, without surety, for $200,000.00 to indemnify
Anheuser-Busch against any claims which might result from the loss of the original
certificate or the issuance of a new certificate. Agreement between Mr. Reisinger
and the Corporation failed. Thereafter, the executor of Mr. Reisinger brought an
action against Anheuser-Busch Inc., to issue a new stock certificate in lieu of the
old certificate purported to have been lost. The Circuit Court of St. Louis held
that it had a discretionary right to determine the amount of the indemnity bond
to be given by Mr. Reisinger as protection to the corporation upon it issuing a
new certificate to replace certificate # 33. The amount of the bond approved by the
court was $750,000.00 (double the market value of 18,750 shares at $20.00). The
defendant appealed. The Missouri Supreme Court held that an open penalty
bond was required prior to issuance of a new certificate.
Section 17 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, Laws of Missouri 1943, reads
as follows: "Where a certificate has been lost or destroyed, a court of competent
jurisdiction may order the issue of a new certificate thereof on service of process
upon the corporation and on reasonable notice by publication, and in any other
way which the court may direct, to all persons interested, and upon satisfactory
proof of such loss or destruction and upon the giving of a bond with sufficient
surety to be approved by the court to protect the corporation or any person injured
by the issue of the new certificate from any liability or expense, which it or. they
may incur by reason of the original certificate remaining outstanding. The court
may also in its discretion order the payment of the corporation's reasonable costs
and counsel fees.
14. ALA. CODE Tit. 47, § 111 (1940); GA. CODE § 67-108 (1933); Miss. CODE
§ 870 (1942); OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 46, § 58 (1937); VA. CODE § 55-99 (1950).
1. 231 S.W. 2d 165 (Mo. 1950).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss2/4
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"The issue of a new certificate under an order of the court as provided in this
section, shall not relieve the corporation from liability in damages to a person to
whom the original certificate has been or shall be transferred for value without
notice of the proceedings or of the issuance of the new certificate."2
The problem presented is whether Section 17 of the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act, supra, contemplates the giving of a bond in an amount of indemnity or penalty
fixed by the court in the exercise of the court's discretion, or whether it contemplates an "open penalty bond" whereby the obligors indemnity against liability
on claims in any amount which may arise by reason of the original certificate
remaining outstanding. This problem has never arisen in Missouri and there are
no cases in other jurisdictions directly answering the question.3 It had been held
in Missouri, before the enactment of Section 17, that double liability attached
where the corporation issued two certificates for the same number of shares, 4 and
this principle has long been recognized.5 From the facts presented, it is to be
noted that for 18 years no one had presented certificate #33 to the corporation,
and regular dividend payments.had been made to Mr. Reisinger. On the other hand,
the market price during this period had advanced from $6.12 to $31.00 and the
value of certificate #33 had varied, between $117,375.00 and $581,250.00. The
corporation's possible liability, therefore, varies from zero to an indeterminable
future amount depending on a fluctuating market. The circuit court, exercising
its discretion, set bond at double the present market value, yet the stock had increased 500% in 18 years. Section 17 specifically requires a bond for the purpose of protecting the corporation from any liability by reason of the original
certificate remaining outstanding.
Section 17 has been adopted by the great majority of the states which have
enacted the Uniform Transfer Act. Seven states adopting this act have changed
Section 17. The New York statute is representative of the statutes in these few
states. It expressly provides that the bond given in the case of the issuance of a
new certificate in lieu of a lost certificate shall be, "an amount which shall appear
to the court sufficient in the circumstances of the case to protect the interests of any
persons to whom the corporation may incur liability, and shall be in such form
and with such sureties as the court shall approve" and further provides, "The
2.
Mo. REv.

Mo. Laws 1943, p. 495, Mo. REv.
STAT.

STAT. ANN.

§ 5563.17 (Supp. 1950),

§ 403, 210 (1949).

3. In Dyer v. Bridge Heights Realty Co., 170 La. 1092, 129 So. 647 (1930),
there is dictum to the effect that under Section 17 of the act, the power of the
court is limited to requiring the bond in an amount to -be fixed witfiin its discretion
with such surety thereon as may meet with the court's approval. In Bringardner
Lumber Co. v. Crockett's Administratrix, 304 Ky. 324, 200 S.W. 2d 753 (1947),
it is pointed out that the responsibility for the loss of the certificate can in no
way be placed upon the appellant, thus indicating that an open penalty bond is
required. This is the extent of available case law.
4. Keller v. The Eureka Brick Machine Manufacturing Co., 43 Mo. App.
84, 11 L.R.A. 472 (1890).
5. Supply Ditch Co. v. Elliott, 10 Colo. 327, 15 Pac. 691 (1887); McCoy
v. New Orleans Cotton Exchange, 114 La. 324, 38 So. 204 (1905)- Alimon v.
Salem Building and Loan Association, 275 IIl. 366, 114 N.E. 170 (1916).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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corporation shall not be liable to any such transferee (of the original certificate)
in an amount in excess of the amount of the bond or the amount of the security
required to be deposited." 6 On the assumption that Section 17 as originally drafted
required an "open penalty bond," these statutes allow discretion in fixing the
amount of the bond, but at the same time provide complete protection to the
corporation since it is in no way at fault. Also, these statutes suggest the impossibility of separating the extent of the security from the problem of liability
to the corporation.
In the case of administrator's bonds the Missouri statute7 requires a bond,
"in such amount as the court or judge or clerk shall deem 'sufficient, not less than
double the amount of the personal estate." As to an appeal bond in Missouris
the court may, "fix the amount of the supersedeas bond." In contrast, the language of Section 17 would seem to exclude an exercise of discretion by the court
as to the amount of a bond in the instant case.
ROBERT L. RILEY

CRIMINAL LAv-ENTRAPMENT-CRIMINAL

LIABILITY OF OFFICERS

1

Reigan. v. People

It is a rare case when the convicted defendants in a criminal prosecution are
officers of the law, prosecuted for an overzealous attempt at the performance of
their duty.
Such was the principal case. Defendants were game wardens of the state of
Colorado. They were convicted, under a general conspiracy statute 2 and an
accessory statute, 3 of conspiring to commit the crime and misdemeanor of unlawfully trapping and killing beaver, and the unlawful possession of the hides of
beaver, and of conspiring to become accessories before the fact of such crimes contrary to the form of the statutes. 4 Defendants represented themselves as fur
buyers and sought to induce two boys, not then engaged in unlawful trapping,
to agree to trap and kill beaver to be delivered to defendants. Held: the conviction must stand since the acts of defendants amounted to an attempted entrapment of the boys.
The only other case in point, coming to the attention of the writer, is Con-

6. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 178, as amended by L. 1940, c. 13, § 2; DEIA.
§ 70 (1935) (§17 omitted); CAL. CORPORATIONS CODE § 2485 (Deering,
1948); FLA. LAWS 1943, c. 21894, § 19; GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1917 (1933); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 21-1121 (1943); Maryland omitted Section 17 completely.
7. Mo. REv. STAT. § 18 (1939), Mo. REV. STAT. § 461.260 (1949).
8. General Code for Civil Procedure, Mo. Laws, 1943, § 132.
1. 210 P. 2d 991 (Colo. 1949).
"2. COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48 § 177 (1935).
3. COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 48 § 13 (1935).
4. It appears that the charge of conspiracy to become accessories before the
fact was the principal charge relied upon by the People.
REV. CODE
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monwealt. ex rel. Dennis Shea v. Leads, Sheriff.5 In that case defendants, who
appeared to be officers of the law, were arrested and charged with conspiracy to
induce another to sell beer, in violation of a Sunday liquor law. Defendants instituted a habeas corpus proceeding, there contending that their purpose had been
lawful. Refusing to discharge them, Judge Paxtono said, ". . . assuming such to
have been their purpose, did they resort to any unlawful means to accomplish it?
If they did ... there was a conspiracy ... These relators, in their anxiety to procure evidence ... went a step too far ... they urged and persuaded him to furnish
beer; in fact they resorted to artifice and deception for that purpose. . . . The.
resort to such means . .. is more than questionable. The law does not sanction
it...."

One difference between the principal case and the Shea case is that in the
former case nothing beyond a tentative agreement between defendants and the boys
to trap beaver took place, while in the latter case beer was given to defendants,
though no sale thereof was consummated.
A distinguishable type of case7 growing out of facts similar to those of the
principal case is a case where defendants induce criminal acts, not with a purpose
of performing some public duty, but to receive a reward or other personal gain
for reporting the crime.8
Cases in which courts have often expressed an opinion or collaterally stated
that officers might be criminally responsible for inducing criminal acts by third
parties are those in which the non-officer defendants contend that the testifying
officers are accomplices and, therefore, their testimony must be corroborated. It
should be noted, however, that in these cases the officers are not being tried. In
the leading case of Dever v. State9 the court pointed out that if the officer. had
incited the conspiracy he certainly would be an accomplice and perhaps a principal.
In a similar case, Smit. v. State,10 the court held that one sent by officers to purchase liquor contrary to the form of the statute was an accomplice and corroboration of his testimony was necessary."
Cases involving an entrapment as a defense are replete with dicta expressing
the attitude of the court toward the conduct of the entrapping officers. In O'Brien
v. United States:12 ". . . . if the conspiracy were unlawful it must have been so
not only to those who subsequently joined it, but also to those who originated it."

5. 9 Phila. 569 (1872).
6. Judge Paxton later became a judge and then Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See 26 D.C. 178, 184 (Pa. 1916).
7. See Hazen v. Commonwealth, 23 Pa. 355 (1854).
8. It should be noted that the principal case held that desire for personal
gain is not needed for successful prosecution.
9. 37 Tex. Cr. Rep. 396, 30 S.W. 1071 (1895).
10. 93 Tex. Cr. Rep. 529, 248 S.W. 685 (1923).
11. See also Carr v. State, 128 Tex. Cr. Rep. 510, 82 S.W. 2d 667 (1935);
Plachy v. State, 91 Tex. Cr. Rep. 405, 239 S.W. 979 (1922); Bush v. State, 68 Tex.
Cr. Rep. 299, 151 S.W. 554 (1912).
12. 51 F. 2d 674 (C.C.A. 7th 1931).
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In Connwr v. People:13 ".... when in their zeal, or under a mistaken sense of duty,
detectives suggest the commission of crime, and instigate others to take part in its
commission in order to arrest them while in the act, although the purpose may be
to capture old offenders, their conduct is not only reprehensible, but criminal, and
ought to be rebuked, rather than encouraged, by the courts . . .it shows a state
of facts that have no place in the decent administration of justice." The Missouri
Supreme Court in State v. Lee14 stated, ". . . (the) conduct of the officers in furnishing money to Hutchison to go into the place and start a game cannot be too
severely condemned." In State v. Torphy' 5 defendant, a city councilman, actually
entered into an illegal poker game, but in order to detect the participants. Though
defendant was acquitted, there was a strong dissent stating that defendant was
guilty; that he might properly detect the participants, but not actually participate in
the act for which the offenders were sought. Wharton' 6 in his work on criminal
evidence states that one who incites a crime is an accomplice, and no distinction is
made between officers and non-officers.
There are other cases, however, stating either. by way of dicta or direct holding
that officers are not criminally responsible for their acts when purporting to perform
their duty. 1'7 In Woodworth v. State, "I the court held that there was no crime
committed when an officer entrapped. A number of these cases are determined on
the question of intent. In State v. Hicks, 9 a prosecution defended on a theory of
entrapment, the defendant was exonerated because the crime was conceived in the
mind of an officer. The court said of the officer, "The criminal intent was lacking,
for his purpose was to detect." In State v. Lee,2° supra, the court found a lack of
intent to be an accomplice on the part of the one acting in behalf of the officers.
Similarly, in Commonwealth. v. Baker2 ' the court refused to rule as a matter of
law that an officer participating in gaming (not for pleasure) was an accomplice.
In Love v. People22 defendant was induced to aid an officer in committing burglary (the officer was entrapping). The court said the officer committed no crime
because there was a lack of felonious intent, and, therefore, defendant could not
be an accomplice. Corpus Juris Secvndutm23 points out that it is a crime to incite
crime, but it seems to make an exception in the case of detectives seeking evidence.
It seems clear that a number of courts, if presented with an opportunity,
24
would hold as the Colorado court in the principal case.
13. 18 Colo. 373, 33 Pac. 159 (1893).
14. 228 Mo. 480, 128 S.W. 987 (1910).
15. State v. Torphy, 78 Mo. App. 206 (1899).
16. 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 440 (10th ed. 1912).
17. See, e.g., note 15 supra.
18. 20 Tex. Cr. Rep. 275 (1886).
19. 326 Mo. 1056, 33 S.W. 2d 923 (1930).
20. See note 14 supra.
21. 155 Mass. 287, 29 N.E. 512 (1892).
22. 60 Ill. 501, 43 N.E. 710 (1896).
23. 15 C.J.S. 108.
24. A distinction should be made between cases such as the principal case
and those in which an officer commits a crime, but with no pretense of performing
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The court's theory of prosecution in the principal case, though apparently
upholding the conviction primarily on the charge of conspiracy to become accessories before the fact, emphasized the fact that there was an attempted entrapment. A careful distinction was made between entrapment and detection. The
former was said to be when officers induce a third party to commit a crime he
would not otherwise have committed. The crime must have had its beginning
in the minds of the entrapping officers. Detection, on the other hand, results when
officers have reason to suspect a crime is being or about to be committed and they
merely afford opportunity for defendant to transgress the law, short of actual
participation themselves. The crime is originated with defendant in such cases.
Traditionally, it is to be seen that the one induced to commit a crime is
charged therewith, and the entrapment is used as a defense.2 5 The state, prosecuting, contends that there is no entrapment, and that the officers were merely detecting.26 It is interesting to note that defendants here were obliged to use detection,
so often an aid to the prosecution, as a defense when they were confronted with
a prosecution based upon what amounted to an attempted entrapment. It is more
than doubtful that the court looked upon entrapment per se as a crime.27 There is no
need of a new and separate crime-conspiracy to become accessories before the
fact is obviously sufficient. It remains, however, that the facts do set out an attempted entrapment, and by its very definition it is an inciting of one to commit
crime. This, then, suggests the conclusion: When there is in fact an entrapment,
there is a valid defense to prosecution of the one entrapped; and further, there
is also a crime committed by the entrapping officers.
It is questionable whether the cases cited supra, indicating that an officer
might not be criminally responsible when he is entrapping, considered all of the
theories of prosecution suggested by the principal case. In addition, with the
his duty. See e.g., State v. Grunewald, 211 Minn. 74, 300 N.W. 206 (1941), where
defendant officer was convicted of wilful neglect of duty in failing to arrest keepers
of house of ill-fame. State v. Palmersten, 210 Minn. 476, 299 N.W. 669 (1941),
where defendant officer was convicted of wilful neglect of duty in respect to a house
of ill-fame by receiving money from the operator thereof. State v. Raasch, 201
Minn. 158, 275 N.W. 620 (1937), where defendant officer encouraged gambling
through horse racing and slot machines and furnished information to unauthorized
persons in regard to police activities which affected them.
25. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 43 Sup. Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413
(1932); Morei v. United States, 127 F. 2d 827 (C.C.A. 6th 1942); O'Brien v.

United States, 51 F. 2d 674 (C.C.A. 7th 1931); Butts v. United States, 273 Fed.
35 (C.C.A. 8th 1921); United States v. Lynch, 256 Fed. 983 (S.D. N.Y. 1919);

United States v. Echols, 253 Fed. 862 (S.D. Texas 1918); Scott v. Commonwealth,
303 Ky. 353, 197 S.W. 2d 774 (1946); State v. Hicks, 326 Mo. 1056, 33 S.W. 2d

923 (1930); State v. Decker, 321 Mo. 1163, 14 S.W. 2d 617 (1929); Sanders v.
State, 72 Okla. Cr. Rep. 85, 113 P. 2d 198 (1941); Warren v. State, 35 Okla. Cr.
Rep. 430, 251 Pac. 101 (1926); Humphrey v. State, 212 S.W. 2d 159 (Tex. 1948).

26. Shaw v. United States, 151 F. 2d 967 (C.C.A. 6th 1945); Mitchell v.
United States, 143 F. 2d 953 (C.C.A. 10th 1944); People v. Seely, 66 Cal. App.
408, 152 P. 2d 454 (1944); Peoplev. Paderewski, 373 Ill. 197,25 N.E. 2d 784 (1940).
Cf. Wilson v. People, 108 Colo. 441. 87 P. 2d 5 (1939).
27. It has not been so considered. See note 25 supra.
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facts as presented, the common law crime of solicitation might well have been used
as a basis of prosecution of the officer defendants. It perhaps would be less circuitous than a charge of conspiracy to become accessories before the fact of a
given crime.28 Further, when there is just one officer entrapping, thus precluding any
question of conspiracy, solicitation could be relied upon by the state.
It is submitted that there are sufficient and adequate laws under which officers
of the law might be convicted for criminal excesses even though committed when
the officers are purporting to perform their duty.29 This is to say, the technical
obstacles do not present a serious problem. The conspicuous lack of such cases
as the principal case is more likely due to practical obstacles such as the close association between the officers and the prosecutor and the laxness or unwillingness
on the part of a prosecutor to harrass those upon whom he must depend for adequate evidence in other prosecutions.
When in fact officers do over reach their bounds and commit an act for which
they might be criminally responsible, there would seem to be no reason to exempt
them, as compared with non-officers, from criminal prosecution. "It was never
' 0
intended that a man should violate the law in order to vindicate the law."
JAcK L. BRANT
MASTER AND SERVANT-SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT

Linam v. Mwrly'
Plaintiff was enrolled with defendants, who conducted a flying school, for a
private flying course. On July'll, 1948, defendant Weese instructed one Cooke,
defendants' flying instructor, to take the plaintiff "out for some dual instruction."
Plaintiff executed the take-off and handled the plane for several miles' flight.
Cooke then said, "Let me have it," and took control without telling plaintiff why
he wanted control. Cooke proceeded to buzz 2 various objects and continued this
for a few minutes. The result was that the plane struck some power lines and the
ship plunged into a stream. Plaintiff sued the defendants for personal injuries sustained in the crash.
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed a directed verdict for the defendants
28. The crime of solicitation "consists in urging, inciting, requesting, or advising another to commit a crime.

See 1 BuRDicK,

LAW OF CRIME

§ 104 (1946).

There should be little difficulty in utilizing the crime of solicitation in cases of
misdemeanors. Burdick, supra, points out that

.....

solicitations to commit mis-

demeanors of an evil or vicious nature are indictable, including such misdemeanors
as especially affect public society." See also, Commonwealth v. McHale, 97 Pa.
397 (181). "The test is not whether precedents can be found in the books, but
whether they injuriously affect the public police and economy."
29. See note 24. supra.
30. Judge Paxton in Commonwealth ex rel. Dennis Shea v. Leeds, Sheriff,
9 Phila. 569, 570 (1872).
1. 232 S.W. 2d 937 (Mo. 1950).
2.

"'.

.

. maneuvers of aircraft close to the ground, or close to objects on the

ground at a speed in access of normal cruising speed, usually accomplished by diving
on objects and then pulling up in a sharp climb."' 232 S.W. 2d at p. 940.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol16/iss2/4

14

et al.: Recent Cases
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

and held that Cooke was acting within the scope of his employment while operating
the plane. The ruling was limited to the facts.
The case did not involve treating the defendant as a common carrierO or the
plane as a dangerous instrumentality.'
The idea that a master should be liable for the torts of his servant is founded
on certain dicta of Lord Chief Justice Holt, and while the theories advanced to
explain it have filled countless pages, 6 it is still somewhat of an anomaly in the
common law. A limitation on the doctrine of vicarious liability was also established so that a master became liable for the torts of his servant only when the
act done was done in the scope of employment.7 Since the advent of the "frolic"
and the "detour", courts have struggled to evolve rules whereby the scope of employment can be determined. 9
Missouri courts are no exception and the results no more successful than else3. See North American Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pitts, 213 Ala. 102, 104 So. 21,. 1928
U. S. Av. R. 178 (1925), for a discussion of the attributes of a common carrier as
applied to airplanes; See also 1 J. AIR L. 241 (1930).
4. See Euting v. Chicago and N. W. Ry., 116 Wis. 13, 92 N.W. 358 (1902),
and Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Shields, 47 Ohio St. 387, 24 N.E. 658 (1890),
for doctrine that a playful motive on the part of the servant with no intention to
serve the master will not absolve the master if he has entrusted a "dangerous instrumentality" to the servant. Contra: Obertoni v. Boston & Me. R.R., 186 Mass.
481, 71 N.E. 980 (1904).
5. Turberville v. Stampe, Carth. 425, 1 Com. 32, Comb. 459, Holt, K. B. 9,
1 Ld. Raym. 264, 12 Mod. Rep. 152, 1 Salk. 13, Skin. 681, 91 Eng. Rep. 1072
(1697); Jones v. Hart, 2 Salk. 441, Holt, K. B. 642, 91 Eng. Rep. 382 (1698); For a
quotation allegedly from the Turberville case stating that a master is liable for the
acts of his servants, see Patten v. Rea, 2 C.B.N.S. 606, 26 L.J.C.P. 235, 29 L.T.O.S.
161, 21 J. P. 647, 3 Jur N. S. 892, 5 W. R. 689, 3140 Eng. Rep. 554 (1857); See
BATY, VICARIoUs LIILrITy 7-34 (1916), for an excellent account of how the agency
doctrine grew.
6. BAT'Y, VicARIous LIABILITY (1916); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Adininistrationof Risk, 38 YALE L. J. 584 (1929); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L. J. 105 (1916); Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COL. L. REV. 444, 716
(1923); Comment, 2 Mo. L. REv. 351 (1937).
7. See Mitchell v. Crassweller, 13 C.B. 237, 22 L.J.C.P. 100, 20 L.T.O.S. 237,
17 Jur. 716, 1 W.R. 153, 138 Eng Rep. 1189 (18,53); Joel v. Morrison, 6 C. & P.
501, 176 Eng. Rep. 1338 (1834); M'Manus v. Crickett, 1 East. 106, 102 Eng. Rep.
43 (1800) (willful torts were always without the scope of employment until Croft
v. Allison, 4 B & Aid. 590, 106 Eng. Rep. 1052 (1821)).
8. Joel v. Morrison, 6 Car. & P. 501, 172 Eng. Rep. 1338 (1834); "The master
is only liable where the servant is acting in the course of his employment. If he was
going out of his way, against the master's implied commands, when driving on his
master's business, he will make his master liable; but if he was going on a frolic of
his own, without being at all on his master's business, the master will not be liable."
In Mitchell v. Crassweller, 13 C.B. 237, 22 L.J.C.P. 100, 20 L.T.O.S. 237, 17 Jur.
716, 1 W.R. 153, 138 Eng. Rep. 1189 (1853), it was held that the driver was serving
only his own purpose and that he was therefore on a frolic of his own In Ritchie
v. Waller, 63 Conn. 155, 28 At]. 29, 27 L.R.A. 161, 38 Am. St. Rep. 361 (1893), a
servant who went after some shoes while delivering for the master was held to have
merely "detoured" as he was still serving his master's purpose as well as his own.
See in general Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 CoL. L. REv. 444, 716 (1923).
9. See footnote 6 and TIFFANY ON AGENCY § 38, pp. 105-110 (2d ed. 1924).
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where. 10 A Missouri Law Revie'v writer in 1937 stated that "Until the Supreme
Court has ruled on more of the cases,, it will be impossible for a lawyer to know
definitely what factors are to be the motivating factors for Missouri courts."" It
is still necessary in 1951 for a writer to preface his remarks with a similar statement;
however, due to the variety of fact situations presented by the "scope of employment" cases, it is unlikely that a lawyer can ever know "definitely" what the factors
are.
The basic rule followed by the Missouri courts in determining the scope of
employment is that the master is liable if his business was being done and his
general purpose promoted.' 2 The theory of liabilty, though authority is not too
conclusive, appears to be based on the idea that the master should employ fit
servants."3 Scope of employment is not a technical phrase' 4 and must be implied
from the circumstances;' 5 each case, therefore, depends on the particular facts involved, 16 and the generality of the Missouri test makes the test's application,
either by jury or court, quite difficult. If the act is clearly within the scope of employment, it is so held as'a matter of law.17 If the act is clearly without the 'scope
of employment, it is so held as a matter of law.' 8 In all other cases it is for the
jury to decide whether-the servant was performing his master's business. 19
Even though the servant may have his own personal desires in mind at the
time of the act in question, the master will be liable if his business was being performed. 20 The fact that the servant was disobeying express orders will not relieve
10. Compare, for instance, Anderson v. Nagel, 214 Mo. App. 134, 259
S.W. 858 (1924), and Ursch v. Heier, 210 Mo. App. 129, 241 S.W. 439 (1922) with
Slothewer v. Clark, 191 Mo. App. 105, 179 S.W. 5.5 (1915). See 2 Mo. L. REv. 351
(1937) for an anlysis of these cases.
11. 2 Mo. L. Ray. 351, 356 (1937).
12. Wolf v. Terminal R. R. Assoc., 282 Mo. 559, 222 S.W. 114 (1920); Guthrie
v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215, 198 S.W. 854, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 1128 (1917); Hinkle v.
Railroad, 199 S.W. 227 (Mo. 1917); Maniaci v. Express Co., 266 Mo. 633, 182 S.W.
981 (1916); Whiteacre v. Railroad, 262 Mo. 438, 160 S.W. 1009 (1913), aff'd 239
U. S.421 (1915); Garretzen v. Duenckel, 50 Mo. 104 (1872); Ursch v. Heier, 210
Mo. App. 129, 141 S.W. 439 (1922).
13. Haehl v. Wabash R.R., 119 Mo. 325, 339, 24 S.W. 737 (1893).
14. Nichols v. Chicago,, R. I. and P. Ry., 232 S.W. 275 (Mo. App. 1921).
15. Ephland v. Mo. Pac. Ry., 137 Mo. 187, 37 S.W. 820, 59 Am. St. Rep. 498,
35 L.R.A. 107, rehearing denied 137 Mo. 187, 38 S.W. 926 (1896).
16. Chiles v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 230 Mo. App. 350, 91 S.W. 2d
164 (1936); Schmitt v. American Press, 42 S.W. 2d 969 (Mo. App. 1931); Borah v.
Zoellner Motor Car Co., 257 S.W. 145 (Mo. App. 1925); Noland v. Morris and Co.,
212 Mo. App. 1, 248 S.W. 627 (1923); Wrightman v. Glidewell, 210 Mo. App. 367,
239 S.W. 574 (1922).
17. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Kansas City Rys., 207 Mo. App.
137, 231 S.W. 277 (1921).
18. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Kansas City Rys., 207 Mo. App.
137, 231 S.W. 277 (1921); Anderson v. Nagel, 214 Mo. App. 134, 259 S.W. 858
(1924); Ursch v. Heier, 210 Mo. App. 129, 141 S.W. 439 (1922).
19. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Kansas City Rys., 207 Mo. App.
137, 231 S.W. 277 (1921); Sullivan v. Thurman, 266 S.W. 745 (Mo. App. 1924).
20. Foster v. Campbell, 355 Mo. 349, 199 S.W. 2d 147 (1946); Byrnes v.
Poplar Bluff Printing Co., 74 S.W. 2d 20 (Mo. 1934); La Bella v. Southwestern
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is not liable.
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Where the business of the master was not being performed, the master

22

The Missouri courts have generally paid more attention to the act of the
servant than to his purpose,23 and the state of mind of the servant has been held
to be of little importance. 2' However, in 1944 the supreme court cited with approval the Restatement of Agency doctrine that "Conduct of a servant is within
the scope of employment if, but only if ... it is actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve the master."25 The instant case, on the other hand, states that "His
Bell Telephone Co., 224 Mo. App. 708, 24 S.W. 2d 1072 (1930); Noland v. Morris
and Co., 212 Mo. App. 1, 248 S.W. 627 (1922).
21. Porter v. Thompson, 357 Mo. 31, 206 S.W. 2d 509 (1947); Riggs v. Higgins, 341 Mo. 1, 106 S.W. 2d 1 (1937); Garretzen v. Duenckel, 50 Mo. 104, 11 Am.
Rep. 405 (1872); Slothower v. Clark, 191 Mo. App. 105, 179 S.W. 55 (1915); Moore
v. Jefferson City Light, Heat and Power Co., 163 Mo. App. 266, 146 S.W. 825
(1912).
22. Milazzo v. Kansas City Gas Co., 180 S.W. 2d 1 (Mo. 1944) (assault on
meter man); Smothers v. Welch & Co. House Furnishing Co., 310 Mo. 144, 274
S.W. 678, 40 A.L.R. 1209 (1925) (rape by clerk); Guthrie v. Holmes, 272 Mo. 215,
198 S.W. 854, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 1128 (1917) (drunken joy-ride by chauffeur);
Priest v. F. W. Woolworth Five and Ten Cent Store, 228 Mo. App. 23, 62 S.W. 2d
926 (1933) (manager bent customer back over counter); Ursch v. Heier, 210 Mo.
App. 129, 141 S.W. 439 (1922) and Anderson v. Nagel, 214 Mo. App. 134, 259 S.W.
858 (1924) (servant went on personal journey after completing journey for master).
23. See footnote 22. Wolf v. Terminal Railroad Association, 282 Mo. 559, 563,
222 S.W. 114 (1920), states that "The fact that the act was done during the time
of the servant's employment is not conclusive, nor is the motive of the servant so.
The question is, was the act done by virtue of the employment and in furtherance
of the master's business." (italics added).
24. La Bella v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 224 Mo. App. 708, 24 S.W.
2d 1072 (1930).
25. Milazzo v. Kansas City Gas Co., 180 S.W. 2d 1, 6 (Mo. 1944); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 228 (1933); caveat, however, in that the purpose alone will not

make the employer liable if the servant is in other respects outside the duties he
is to perform [Oganaso v. Mellow, 356 Mo. 228, 201 S.W. 2d 365 (1947)]. For
other states' decisions holding the servant must be actuated at least in part by a
purpose to serve the master if the servant is to be held within the scope of employment see: Scott v. Birmingham Electric Co., 250 Ala. 61, 33 So. 2d 344 (1948)
(mental attitude plus time and space requirements determine whether servant is
in scoe of employment); Page Lumber Co. v. Carman, 214 Ark, 784, 217 S.W. 2d
930 (1949) (servant acting for a purpose all his own is a stranger to the master);
McChristian v. Popkin, 75 Cal. App. 2d 249, 171 P. 2d 85 (1946) (servant must
act in behalf of employer to be in scope); Mock v. Polley, 116 Ind. App. 580, 66
N.E. 2d 78 (1946) (master not liable if act not committed to serve him); East
Coast Freight Lines v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 190 Md. 256, 58
A. 2d 290 (1948) (servant must be actuated at least in part by purpose to serve the
master); Kornec v. Mike Horse Mining and Milling Co., 120 Mont. 1, 180 P. 2d 252
(1947) (servant who acts entirely for his own benefit is generally held to be outside the scope); Klause v. Nebraska State Bd. of Agriculture, 150 Neb. 466, 35
N.W. 2d 104 (1948) (servant must do act with a view to the service for which he
was employed); Lemarier v. A. Towle Co., 94 N. H. 246, 51 A. 2d 42 (1947) (an
act is not within the scope if done with no intention to perform it as incident to
service); Louisville and N. R.R. v. Vinson, 310 Ky. 854, 223 S.W. 2d 89 (1949)
(an important factor is whether the servant was motivated, at least in part, by
a purpose to serve his employer.).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1951
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motive is not material if he was still engaged in defendants' business and if his acts
in taking the controls and thereafter operating the plane were part of his duties and
within the scope of employment." 26 In one sense this statement is compatible with
the rule of Restatement; that is, if the court meant a collateral motive or purpose on
the part of the servant was immaterial as long as there was also some purpose to
serve the master, the statement is not inconsistent.27 In another sense, however,
the court has begged the question of whether or not the servant was acting within
the scope of his employment and in determining this the purpose of the servant is
material. Though it is stated that "So long as the act ... is done in the performance
of the master's business as well as 'for fun', such an act ... is deemed to be within
the scope of enployment," 2s the court at no point explains how they found the
servant to be within the scope. It may well be that where the act of the servant
is not a deviation from his regular duties, an inquiry into his purpose would be
immaterial as his acts clearly manifest a purpose to serve the master. However,
when the act itself is a deviation, the act alone is not a manifestation of purpose
and the actual purpose of the servant would appear to be material.29 The "buzzing"
done by the servant in this case may or may not have been actuated by some purpose to instruct. If it was, he was serving his master's business; if it wasn't, he was
serving only his own. The purpose of the act, though, was disregarded by the court
and they found as a matter of law that the servant was within the scope of employment.
Not only was the purpose of the pilot disregarded, but the extent of his deviation was also evidently immaterial to the court. They stated: "In our opinion, it
was impossible for Cooke (the pilot) to have 'deviated' from or gone without the
scope of his employment from the time the plane took off from the Joplin airport."30
This statement, if taken literally, would eliminate any scope of employment test in
the case of pilot-instructors, and the assurance of the court that the absence of a
direct route prompted it fails to explain the breadth of language used.
The effect of the case is to leave one with a decision limited to certain peculiar
26. 232 S.W. 2d at p. 942.
27. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 236 (1933): "An act may be within the scope
of employment although done in part to serve the purposes of the servant or a
third person." (Comment: "If the purpose of serving the master actuates the
servant to any appreciable extent, the master is subject to liability if the act otherwise is within the service.")
28. 232 S.W. 2d at p. 942.
29. For a case so holding and containing similar facts as the instant case, see
Sheboygan Airways v. Ind. Comm., 209 Wis. 352, 245 N.W. 178 (1932); Galveston
H. & S.A. Ry. v. Currie, 100 Tex. 136, 96 S.W. 1073, 10 L.R.A. (N. S.) 367 (1906);
see RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, § 235 (1933). The question of proof of the purpose
of the servant naturally requires testimony .by the servant if the act itself is ambiguous; this means that the servant may in some cases attempt to exonerate his
master. Nevertheless, the fact remains that a master should not be held to pay
for an act which the servant did solely for the servant's own purpose. The jury
must be depended on to weigh the testimony. (In Hankinson v. Lynn Gas and
Electric Co., 175 Mass. 272, 56 N.E. 604 (1900), the jury found the master liable
even though the servant testified he was serving only his own purpose.)
30. 232 S.W. 2d at p. 942.
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facts and with little word of explanation as to the reasoning involved. It seems that
a sounder ground for the decision might have been found; as it is, the already
confused situation of respondeat superior is even more confused. Perhaps the court
felt that greater liability should attach to the owner of an airplane-' or that a contract relationship between the plaintiff and defendant should increase the liability. 2
If these factors or others influenced the decision, it is unfortunate they were not
spelled out instead of stretching "scope of employment" ,into a nonentity. The case
has certainly not furthered an understanding of the "motivating factors" considered
by the Missouri courts.
WILLIAM W.

SHINN

PRAcTica-Forum Non COnveniens-FEDRAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY Acr
State of Missouri v. Mayfield'
Plaintiff, a non-resident of Missouri, brought suit in the Circuit Court of the
City of St. Louis, Missouri based on the Federal Employers' Liability Act 2. The
defendant, a carrier, was a foreign corporation and the accident which gave rise to
the claim of liability for negligence took place outside Missouri. Defendant by
motion to dismiss invoked the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The trial court
denied the motion as being beyond the jurisdiction of the court to grant. Defendant
began a proceeding in mandamus in the Supreme Court of Missouri to compel the
trial court to exercise discretionary jurisdiction in disposing of the motion. The
Supreme Court of Missouri quashed the motions on the ground that, under the cases
of Miles v. Illinois Central R. R.4 and Baltimore and Ohio R. R. v. Kepner', a state
court cannot dismiss a Federal Employers' Liability case solely under the forum
non conveniens doctrine. On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States,
held, the Supreme Court of Missouri should be free to decide the availability of the
principle of forum non conveniens in the suit according to its own local law, no restrictions having been imposed upon a state's application of its own procedural
policies by reason of the fact that the Employers' Liability Act empowered state
courts to entertain suits arising under the act.6
We are concerned here with Section 6 of the Federal Employer's Liability
Act which provides that, "An action may be brought in a district court of the
United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the
31. 232 S.W. 2d at pp. 942-943 "The very natures of airplanes, of air travel
and of the responsibilities of airplane pilots are such that previous applications
of these rules to particular facts (in the horse-drawn automobile and railroad
engine cases) are often of little aid."
32. See BATY, VicAmuous LIABILITY 7-34 (1916); see also 2 HAV. L RnV.
342 (1931).
1. 71 Sup. Ct. 1 (1950).
2. 35 STAT. 65 as amended, 45 U. S. C. A. § 51 et seq. (1943).
3. 359 Mo. 727, 224 S.W. 2d 105 (1949).
4. 315 U.S. 698 (1924).
5. 314 U.S. 44 (1941).
6. 71 Sup. Ct. 1 (1950).
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cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time
of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
under this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several states,
and no case arising under this Chapter and brought in any state court of competent
jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States."
The Supreme Court of the United States construed Section 6 in the case of
Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Kepner.7 In the Kepner case a suit was brought in
a state court of Ohio against an injured resident employee of the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad to enjoin him from prosecuting a suit he had instituted in the
United States District Court of New York under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act for an injury he received in the State of Ohio. The Supreme Court of Ohio
denied the injunction. 8 Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States
the Ohio decision was affirmed. The basis of the decision was that the unqualified
venue provisions of the Employers' Liability, Section 6, supra, created a federal
privilege of venue in federal courts which is not subject to the pre-existing equitable
doctrine of forum non conveniens, but is absolute.
A few months after the Kepner case was decided, the Supreme Court of the
9
United States handed down the decision in the case of Miles v. Illinois Central R.R. ,
another case construing Section 6. In the Miles case, plaintiff, a resident of Tennessee, brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in a Missouri state
court. The defendant railroad was an Illinois corporation but had its principal
offices in Tennessee. The accident giving rise to the claim occurred in Tennessee.
The railroad obtained an injunction in the Tennessee state court forbidding plaintiff to continue his suit in Missouri because of inconvenience and expense to the
railway. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. As in the
Kepner case, Section 6 of the Employers' Liability Act was the basis of the decision.
The court stated that, (emphasis added) "Since the existence of the cause of action
and the privilege of vindicating rights under the F.E.L.A. in state courts spring
from federal law, the right to sue in state courts of proper venue where their jurisdiction is adequate is of the same quality as the right to sue in federal courts. It is
no more subject to interference by state action than was the federal venue in the
Kepner case....".
There is another congressional provision which must be considered at this time
in connection with the problem presented. The 1948 revision of the Judicial
Code, Title 28, United States Code Annotated, contained in section 1404 (a) a provision that, "For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of
Justice, a district court may transfer any civl action to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
A question appears as to what effect this provision has on Section 6 and the
cases decided thereunder proclaiming the right of venue. In the recent cases of
7. Supra note 4.
8. 137 Ohio St. 409, 30 N.E. 2d 982 (1940).
9. 315 U.S. 698 (1942).
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Ex parte Collett' the Supreme Court of the United States answered that question.
The Court stated that, "Prior to the current revision of Title 28 of the United
States Code Annotated, forum non conveniens was not available in Federal Employers' Liability Act suits." The Court observed that Section 1404 (a) does give a
federal district court power to transfer a Federal Employers' Liability Act case if
it sees fit. However, the Court went on to say that, "Section 1404 (a) does not
limit or otherwise modify any right granted in Section 6 of the Liability Act or
elsewhere to bring suit in a particular district. An action may still be brought in
any court, state or federal, in which it might have been brought previously."
On the basis of the Kepner case, the Miles case, and the interpretation of the
effect of Section 1404 (a) of the revised Judicial Cole upon Section 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act by the Court in the Collett case, Judge Tipton of the
Missouri Supreme Court in the principal case, speaking for a unanimous court sitting
en banc, stated that, "Thus it is clear ... a state court cannot dismiss a Federal
Employers' Liability case solely under the forum non conveniens doctrine.""
Certiorari was then taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter who dissented in the Kepner case and the Miles case wrote the
opinion of the court.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that the Missouri Court apparently had deemed
itself bound to deny the motions for dismissal on the ground of forim non conveniens because of the Supreme Court decisions in the Kepner and Miles cases. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter then states, referring to the Kepner and Miles cases, "But
neither of these cases limited the power of a state to deny access to its courts to
persons seeking recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act if in similar
cases the state for reasons of local policy denies resort to its courts and enforces its
policy impartially, . . . so as not to involve a discrimination against Employers'
Liability Act suits and not to offend against the Privileges and Immunities clause
of the Constitution."
It is no doubt true that the Kepner and Miles cases did not of themselves preclude a state from refusing to take jurisdiction of a Federal Employers' Liability
case on the grounds of forum non conveniens since such a fact situation was not
before the court. However the language anA reasoning quoted above from the
cases would seem to lead one to that conclusion, particularly in the light of Mr.
Justice Reed's statement in the Miles case' 2 that, "The Missouri Court here involved must permit the litigation." It is not clear but what Mr. Justice Frank-.
furter's opinion, at one time at least, was that the cases referred to did, though in his
opinion erroneously, establish an absolute right of venue not subject to the rule of
forum non conveniens. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated in his dissent in the Kepner3
case that, "To read the venue provision of the Act as do the majority of the Court
is to translate the permission given a plaintiff to enter Courts previously closed
10.
11.
12.
13.

337
359
315
314

U.S. 55 (1949).
Mo. 827, 224 S.W.2d 105 (1949).
U.S. 698 (1942).
U.S. 44 (1941).
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to him into a withdrawal from the state courts of power historically exercised by
them, and into an absolute direction to the specified federal and state courts to
take jurisdiction."
In any event, Mr. Justice Frankfurter concluded in the principal case, but
with little discussion, that the Supreme Court of Missouri should be relieved of
the compulsion it had felt was enunciated in the Kepner and Miles cases and should
be free to decide the availability of the principle of forum non conveniens according
to its own local law. The cause was therefore remanded for that purpose. Thus a
state may elect to limit the shopping by a plaintiff for a forum in a Federal Employers' Liability case by the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Mr. Justice Jackson observed in a brief concurring opinion that the Miles case
was no longer controlling on the question since it was based expressly on the compulsion invoked by Section 6 of the Liability Act and that compulsion was removed
by Section 1404 (a) of the revised judicial code. Mr. Justice Jackson states,
"Certainly a state is under no obligation to provide a court for two non resident
parties to litigate a foreign born cause of action when the Federal Government
which creates the cause of action, frees its own courts within that state from mandatory consideration of the same case." Mr. Justice Jackson made no mention of
the Missouri Court's reasoning to the effect that, since the Missouri courts have
no power of transfer to be used in such cases, Section 1404 (a) did not relieve
them of the compulsion of Section 6 of the Liability Act as previously interpreted.
Mr. Justice Clark, The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Douglas concurred in dissenting on the ground that the decision below should be upheld if there was any valid ground to sustain it. These members of the court thought
there was such a valid ground since the Missouri Court stated that it was of the
opinion that a contrary decision from the one it reached would violate Article 4,
Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States, in addition to being in discord
with the Kepner and Miles cases.
The present state of law concerning the doctrine of forum non cogveniens
in Federal Employers' cases would appear to be as follows:
1. Under the provisions of Section 1404 (a) of the revised Judicial Code, Title 28,
United States Code, a federal district court may in the "interest of justice" transfer
a Liability Act case to another district court where the action might have been
brought.
2. Under the Mayfield case a state court may refuse jurisdiction to a Liability Act
case on the grounds of forum non conveniens, so long as it does not discriminate
against Employers' Liability Act suits and is careful not to offend against the
Privileges and Immunities clause of the Constitution.
3. It is not at all clear what result will be reached in the future in the Miles
situation where a state court attempts to enjoin a resident citizen from suing in a
foreign state court on a Liability Act clause of action on the ground that such suit
is vexatious and oppressive. The 'Miles case held that such injunction could not
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issue. In the CollertU case the court said, (emphasis added) "Section 1404 (a)
does not limit or otherwise modify any right granted in Section 6 of the Liability
Act or elsewhere to bring suit in the particular district. An action may still be
brought in any court, state or federal, in which it might have been brought previously." But Mr. Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in the Mayfield case
said that, because of 1404 (a), "the Missouri court should no longer regard it [the
Miles case] as controlling."
4. In the Kepner situation where a state court attempts to enjoin a resident
citizen from suing on a Federal Employers' Liability Act cause of action in a
foreign federal district court on the grounds that the suit is inequitable and vexations, it is not clear what result will be reached under 1404 (a). Prior to 1404
(a) the injunction could not issue because the Kepner case held there was a right
of venue created by Section 6 of the Liability Act. As noted above, the Court in
Ex parte Collet' 5 said that a plaintiff's right to use any forum when jurisdiction
existed was not effected by 1404 (a), other than that a district court could transfer the-cause. But now since a federal court may refuse to hear a Liability Actcase because it would be unjust to the defendant, as provided in 1404 (a), may
it not be possible for a state court to enjoin a resident citizen from suing in such
foreign district court for the same reason. Mr. Justice Jackson stated in his concurring opinion in the principal case that the Miles case was inoperative because
of 1404 (a). Since both the Miles case and the Kepner case involve state action
in a Liability Act case and on the same theory, Mr. Justice Jackson may also be of
the opinion that the Kepner case is no longer controlling.
WILLIAM J. CASON*

REAL

PROPERTY-ABSENCE

OF "HEIRS

AND

ASSIGNS"

AS AFFECTING

TRANSFERABILITY OF FISHING RIGHTS

Williams v. Diederick1
Knepel and Matson, separate owners of adjoining tracts of land, both conveyed
by separate warranty deeds a part of each tract to the Missouri, Kansas and Texas
Railroad Company, which intended to construct a reservoir upon such land.
Knepel's deed contained a clause which reserved to himself and Matson ". . . the
exclusive boating and fishing privileges on any reservoir which the said Railway
Company may construct on the land covered by this deed with equal rights to
each." Matson's deed contained an almost identical provision. The words "heirs
and assigns" were not used in the reservation clause of either deed. Knepel sold
and assigned his fishing and boating rights2 to one Watson, and the defendants
14. 337 U.S. 55 (1939).
15. Ibid.
*Attorney, Clinton, and former student editor of the Review. B.S. 1948,
LL.B., Feb. 1951, University of Missouri.
1. 359 Mo. 683, 223 S.W. 2d 402 (1949). See Eckhardt, Property, 15 Mo.
L. REv. 399 (1950).
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obtained these rights through successive assignments. The retained tract of land
owned by Matson was later conveyed to the plaintiff, and the retained Knepel tract
was conveyed to the defendants' intestate. The Railroad Company leased the entire
reservoir to the plaintiff. Both parties asked for a determination of the title and
interest in the land. The issue was whether or not the rights and privileges reserved by the grantors are inheritable and assignable. Affirming the judgment of the
lower court that the defendants have no rights in the land, the Missouri Supreme
Court held that the reservation clause in the Matson deed conveyed nothing to
Knepel, who was a stranger to the deed; the reservation clause in the Knepel deed
conveyed nothing to Matson, who was a stranger to that deed; and that due to the
absence of the words "heirs and assigns" the rights reserved were merely personal
rights and as such were not inheritable or assignable.
In order to ascertain the transferability of fishing rights it is necessary to ascertain whether such rights constitute a mere license, or an easement in gross, or. a
profit a prendre in gross, or an appurtenant easement or profit. The general rule is
that neither a license3 nor an easement in gross 4 is assignable or inheritable, whereas
a profit a prendre in gross constitutes an estate in the land itself 5 and is assignable
and inheritable. 6 A license 7 or an easement in gross" constitutes a personal privilege
2. Boating rights, in so far as they are exercised in conjunction with the
fishing rights, are treated the same as the fishing rights. Bosworth v. Nelson, 170
Go. 279, 152 S.E. 575 (1930). But, it is highly doubtful whether boating rights
for mere "pleasure" can be carved out of an estate. Eckhardt, op. cit. sw.pra note 1.
at 400, 401. This note does not purport to deal with this question, hence boating
and fishing rights will be treated the same, and for the purpose of brevity only
fishing rights will hereafter be referred to.
3. Davidson v. Dingeldive, 259 Ii. 367, 129 N.E. 79 (1920); Fuhr v. Dean,
26 Mo. 116, 69 Am. Dec. 484 (1857); CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 33 (2d ed. 1947); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 832,
p. 407 (3d ed. 1939).
4. Salem Capital Flour Mills Co. v. Stayton Water-Ditch and Canal Co.,
33 Fed. 146, 154 (1887); Traylor v. Parkinson, 355 I1. 476, 189 N.E. 307 (1934);
Wooldridge v. Smith, 243 Mo. 190, 147 S.W. 1019 (1912); Saratoga State Waters
Corporation v. Pratt, 227 N. Y. 429, 125 N.E. 834 (1920); Boatman v. Lashley,
23 Ohio St. 614 (1873); CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH
"RUN WITH LAND," III, p. 67 (2d ed 1947); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 761,
pp. 211, 212 (3d ed. 1939); 17 AM. JuR., Easements, § 11, p. 932.
However, some jurisdictions hold out that an easement in gross is capable
of being assignable or inheritable if such intention is establisfied in the instrument
creating the easement. Miller v. Lutheran Conference and Camp Ass'n, 331 Pa.
241, 200 Atl. 646 (1938), 130 A.L.R. 1245 (1941).
5. Bosworth v. Nelson, 170 Ga. 279, 152 S.E. 575 (1930); Marias River
Syndicate v. Big West Oil Co., 98 Mont. 254, 38 P. 2d 599 (1934); Saratoga State
Waters Corporation v. Pratt, 227 N. Y. 429, 125 N.E. 834 (19205; 19 Am. JUR.,
Estates, § 14, p. 473.
6. Minnesota Valley Gun Club v. Northline Corporation, 207 Minn. 126,
290 N.W. 222 (1940); Marias River Syndicate v. Big West Oil Co., 98 Mont. 254,
38 P. 2d 599 (1934); Saratoga Waters Corporation v. Pratt, 227 N. Y. 429, 125
N.E. 834 (1920); CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN
WITH LAND" p. 65 (2d ed. 1947); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY " 843, p. 434 (3d ed.
1939).
7. Smith v. Royal Ins. Co., 111 F. 2d 667
(1940), 130 A.L.R. 812 (1941);
Bland v. Bregman, 123 Conn. 61, 192 At]. 703 (1937); Lang v. Dupuis, 382 Ill. 101
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(not appurtenant to other land) to do a particular act that would otherwise have
been unlawful upon the land of another, the main distinction between them being
that the former is a mere permission revocable at will, 9 whereas the latter is an
irrevocable right existing against the members of the community generally, as well
as the owner of the land, to protect the enjoyment of such right.10 A profit a prendre in gross, however, as defined by Tiffany, .... . involves a power to acquire, by

severance or removal from another's land, some thing or things previously constituting a part of the land, or appertaining thereto . . ."11 and this personal p9wer (not

appurtenant to other land) 1 2 exists against the community in general, as well as
the owner of the premises. The distinguishing feature of an easement (and also a
license) is the absence of a right to participate in the soil or product of it in which
there is supposeable value.' 8
Missouri, although not labelling them as such, recognizes rights that at common
law would be called profits a prendre.' 4 The American Law Instituste Restatement
of Property states that the law as to profits and easements is the same, and includes profits within the term "easement." 1 5 However, the great majority of juris-

46 N.E. 2d 21 (1943); Minnesota Valley Gun Club v. Northline Corporation, 207
Minn. 126, 290 N.W. 222 (1940);'Boone v. Stover,.66 Mo. 430 (1877); Latimer
v. Hess, 183 S.W. 2d 996 (Tex., 1944); 3 TIFrANY, REAL PROPERTY § 829, p. 401
(3d ed. 1939).
8. Wooldridge v. Smith, 243 Mo. 190, 147 S.W. 1019, 40 L.R.A. (N. S.)
752 (1912); Power v. Dean, 112 Mo. App. 288, 86 S.W. 1100 (1905); Saratoga
State Waters Corporation v. Pratt, 227 N. Y. 429, 125 N.E. 834 (1920); Richards
v. Trezvant, 185 S. C. 489, 194 S.E. 326 (1937); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 756,
p. 200, § 758, p. 203 (3d ed. 1939).
9. Supra note 7; Power v. Dean, 112 Mo. App. 288, 86 S.W. 1100 (1905);
Desloge v. Pearce, 38 Mo. 588 (1866); Fuhr v. Dean, 26 Mo. 116, 69 Am. Dec.
484 (1857); CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTMER INTERESTS WHIcH "RUN WITi
LANn" 17, 21 (2d ed. 1947).
10. Supra, note 8.
11. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 839, p. 427, § 483, p. 433 (3d ed. 1939). Accord
U. S. v. 1,070 Acres of Land, in Houston County, Ga., 52 Fed. Supp. 373 (M. D.
Ga. 1943). See 25 ORE. L. REv. 217 (1946) for, a discussion on the law of profits
a prendre.
12. Supra, notes 6 and 11.
13. U. S. v. 1,070 Acres of Land, in Houston County, Ga., 52 F. Supp. 378
(M. D. Ga. 1943); Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Penney, 241 Ala. 602, 4 So. 2d
167 (1941); Bosworth v. Nelson, 170 Ga. 279, 152 S.E. 575 (1930); Wooldridge
v. Smith, 243 Mo. 190, 203, 147 S.W. 1019 (1912); Anderson v. Gipson, 144 S.W.
2d 948 (Tex., 1940); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 840, p. 429 (3d ed. 1939).
14. In Boone v. Stover, 66 Mo. 430 (1877), the court called a "right to take
minerals" from the land of another a "license" and because it gave a usufruct
of the land itself the court treated it as an assignable incorpereal hereditament.
It should not be material that the court called it a "license" rather than a "profit."
Probably the reason Missouri courts do not speak in terms of "profit" was the
early statutory mining license act of 187. Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14783-4; Mo. REV.
STAT. §§ 444.010-.020 (1949), and cases thereunder. But a "right to take minerals"
[Boone v. Stover, supraJ must be distinguished from "an estate in the minerals
themselves" [Gordon v. Park, 219 Mo. 600 (1909)]. 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 846, p. 437 (3d ed. 1939).
15. REsTATEmENT, PROPERTY § 450, Special Note (1944).
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dictions' and almost all the text writers'- recognize the distinctions between profits
a prendre and easements as set forth above.
It is not clear whether the Missouri court treated the fishing rights in question
as an easement in gross or as a license, merely holding that the rights were personal
and neither assignable nor inheritable, and, since both Matson and Knepel were
deceased many years before the time of this suit, the court did not find it necessary
to determine the revocability of the personal, "non-inheritable" rights. 8 A few
jurisdictions treat fishing rights as a license; 19 others treat them as an easement in
gross.2 0 The great majority of courts, however, hold fishing rights to be a profit
a prendre in gross on the theory that it constitutes a taking of a part of the soil from
21
the water.
Missouri, by statute, has abolished the common law requirement of technical
words of inheritance to convey an estate in fee simple,22 and in the absence of the
words "heirs and assigns" it is presumed that the grantor intends to convey all of his
estate. 23 Profits a prendre, constituting an estate in the land itself,2 4 may be in fee,

16. Baker v. Kenney, 145 Iowa 638, 124 N.W. 901 (1910); Trimble v. Kentucky River Coal Corporation, 235 Ky. 301, 31 S.W. 2d 367 (1930); St. Helen
Shooting Club v. Mogle, 234 Mich. 60, 207 N.W. 915 (1926); Minnesota Valley
Gun Club v. Northline Corporation, 207 Minn. 126, 290 N.W. 222 (1940); Council
v. Sanderline, 183 N. C. 253, 111 S.E. 365 (1922), 32 A.L.R. 1527 (1924); Saratoga
State Waters Corporation v. Pratt, 227 N. Y. 429, 125 N.E. 834 (1920); Boatman v.
Lashley, 23 Ohio St. 614 (1873).
17. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH
LAND" 65, 67 (2d ed. 1947); GODDARD, EASEMENTS (8th ed. 1921); JONES EASEMENTS §§ 1, 40, 41, 49, .52 (1898); TIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW Or REAL PROPERTY
§ 424, p. 613 (4th ed. 1924); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 840, pp. 429, 430 (3d
ed. 1939); 2 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY §1227, p. 274 (1902); WARVELLE, REAL
PROPERTY 19

(1896).

18. Spra, note 14.
19. Boyd v. Colgan, 126 Kan. 497, 268 Pac. 794 (1928); Beach v. Morgan,
67 N. H. 529, 41 Atl. 349 (1894).
20. Schultz v. Carter, 153 Va. 730, 151 S.E. 130 (1930).
21. Bosworth v. Nelson, 170 Ga. 279, 152 S.E. 575 (1930); Baker v. Kenney,
145 Iowa 638, 124 N.W. 901 (1910); Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83, 99, 100 (11861)
(dictum) (regarding seaweed); Minnesota Valley Gun Club v. Northline Corporation, 207 Minn. 126, 290 N.W. 222 (1940); Council v. Sanderlin, 183 N. C. 253,
111 S.E. 365 (1922), 32 A.L.R. 1527 (1924); Albright v. Cortright, 64 N. J. 330,
45 Atl. 634 (1900); Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa. St. 21 (1869); Anderson
v. Gipson, 144 S.W. 2d 948 (Tex. 1940); Peers against Lucy, 4 Mod. 362 (1793);

17 Am. Jui., Eafeimnets § 6, p. 928; 3

TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY

§ 839, p. 427

(3d ed. 1939); 2 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY § 1227, p. 275 (6th ed. 1902). See
Greisinger v. Klinhart, 282 S.W. 473 (Mo. Ct. of App. 1926), holding that the
"right of the public to fish in private waters cannot be claimed by custom," and
cases cited thereunder.
22. Mo. REV. STAT. p. 119, § 2 (183 ); Tygard v. Hartwell, 204 Mo. 200
(1907).
23. The current statute, Mo. REV. STAT. § 442.460 (1949), is the same as
Mo. REV. STAT. § 3496 (1939), and reads as follows: "The term 'heirs,' or other
words of inheritance, shall not be necessary to create or convey an estate in fee
simple, and every conveyance of real estate shall pass all the estate of the grantor
therein, unless the intent, to pass a less estate shall expressly appear, or be neces-

sarily implied in the 'terms of the Grant."
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25

for life or for years. It therefore would seem that if Missouri recognized the law
of profits, the above statute would apply in the present case to give the holder of the
fishing rights an estate in fee, and the absence of the words "heirs and assigns"
would not affect the transferability of such an interest.26 It would appear to be
within the policy of the statute to apply it also to easements.2 An easement is an
interest in land 28 (an incorporeal hereditament) 29 (and has been held to constitute
an estate in land) 30 and may be made to endure in perpetuity.," In most jurisdictions, however, an easement in gross is of such a personal nature that it is not
transferable ". . . even though the instrument creating it conveys it to the grantee
and his heirs and assigns forever;"' 2 therefore it would appear that the absence of
the words "heirs and assigns," the reason given by the court in the present case,
or an application of the above statute, would not affect the transferability of such
an interest. But since Missouri, unlike most jurisdictions, allows an easement to
include a participation in the profits of the soil, a good argument could be made for
applying the statute and permitting an easement in gross to be transferable. 3
The Missouri Supreme Court relied heavily on the absence of the words "heirs
and assigns" in holding that the fishing rights reserved were personal rights, but in
jurisdictions having a statute like that previously discussed, the presence or absence
of the words "heirs and assigns" would by no means tend to show that the rights
and privileges reserved were intended to be merely personal. 34 If the fishing rights

24. Supra, note 5. But see RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 9 (1944), which does
not consider either a profit or. an easement as an estate.
25. Bosworth v. Nelson, 170 Ga. 279, 152 S.E. 575 (1930); 3 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 839, p. 428 (3d ed. 1939).
26. Cf. Painter v. Pasadena Land and Water Co., 91 Cal. 74, 27 Pac. 539
(1891).
27. Salem Capital Flour Mills Co. v. Stayton Water-Ditch and Canal Co.,
33 Fed. 146 (Cir. Ct. D. Ore. 1887); applies such a statute to an easement, creating
an easement in fee; Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Griswold, 51 Ind. App. 497,
97 N.E. 1030 (1912); Miller v. Miller, 91 Kan. 1, 4, 136 Pac. 953, 954, L.R.Aj
1915A, 671, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 918 (1913); Luttropp v. Kilborn, 186 Wis. 217, 202
N.W. 368 (1925).
28. Traylor v. Parkinson, 355 Ill.
476, 189 N.E. 307 (1934); Saratoga State

Waters Corporation v. Pratt, 227 N. Y. 429, 125 N.E. 834, 839 (1920).
29. TIEDEMAN, AMERICAN LAw OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 422, 423, p. 612 (4th
ed. 1924).
30. Oates v. Town of Headland, 154 Ala. 503, 45 So. 910, 911 (1908); Eliot

v. Carter, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 436, 440 (1832).

3 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 839, p. 428 (3d ed. 1939).
17 Am. JUR., Easements § 11, p. 932; supra, note 4.
Swpra, note 27; cf. Oates v. Town of Headland, 154 Ala. 503, 45 So. 910,
911 (1908); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 761, p. 212 (3d ed. 1939), favoring the
inheritability and assignability of easements in gross. The following articles are
in favor of the transferability of easements in gross: 12 U. OF CIII. L. REV. 276
(1945); 22 Ci-KENT L. REv. 239 (1944); 22 MIcH. L. REv. 521 (1924); 32 YALE
31.
32.
33.

L. J. 813 (1923).
34.

Presbyterian Church of Osceola, Clarke County v. Harken, 177 Iowa 195,

158 N.W. 692 (1916); Dennis v. Wilson, 107 Mass. 591 (1871); Stoutimore v.
Quincy, Omaha & Kansas City R.R., 215 Mo. App. 194, 256 S.W. 121 (1923);
3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 759, p. 206, 207 (3d ed. 1939).
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in question were found to touch and concern the retained land the court would be
justified in holding such rights to be appurtenant,3 5 in which case the fishing rights
could not be transferred separate from the retained land, 36 and an attempt to transfer them separately would merely be null and void and by the better view would not
extinguish the appurtenant rights. 37 At the time of this suit the defendants owned
the tract of land retained by Knepel and ought to have fishing rights if the reservation created a profit a prendre appurtenant or in gross, an easement in gross if
transferable, or an easement appurtenant.
LEONARD A. O'NAL
REAL PROPERTY-TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY-CONVEYING FREE OF INCOME

TAx LIEN AGAINST HUSBAND

Hutcherson v. United States'
H and W owned realty in Kansas City as tenants by the entirety. Marital
trouble arose and H filed suit for divorce. After H filed suit for divorce the Collector
of Internal Revenue filed notice of a tax lien of $109.61 for unpaid taxes assessed
against H, individually, under 26 U.S.C.A. § 3670, "If any person liable to pay any
tax neglects or refuses to pay same after demand, the amount... shall be a lien in
favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real
or personal, belonging to such person." Two weeks later H and W in accordance
with a property settlement agreement conveyed the property to a straw party.
Three weeks after the conveyance, W obtained a divorce from H and two days later
the straw party conveyed the property to W. W instituted this suit against the
United States to quiet title and cancel the lien filed by the Collector of Internal
Revenue.
The United States contended that it had a valid lien, attaching at the time
notice was filed, upon H's interest and rights in property held by H and W as tenants by the entirety, subject to being defeated in the event W survived H. Held:

Neither the estate by the entirety nor the rents or profits therefrom are subject to
an income tax lien for H's delinquent income taxes and H and W by their joint
mutual act may convey free and clear of existing debts of either regardless of their
nature or source.
35. Cf. Moore v. Crose, 43 Ind. 30 (1873); Whitelaw v. Rodney, 212 Mo.
540, 549, 550 (1908). The law as to easements appurtenant and profits a prendre
appurtenant is the same. 3 TIFFANY, REAL

PROPERTY

§ 761, p. 212, § 843, pp. 433,

434 (3d ed. 1939).
36. Moore v. Crose, 43 Ind. 30 (1873); McKenna v. Brooklyn Union Elevated
R.R., 184 N. Y. 391, 77 N.E. 615 (1906); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 761, pp. 213,
214 (3d ed. 1939).
37. 165 Broadway Building, Inc. v. City Investing Co., 120 F. 2d 813, 820
(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1941); McKenna v. Brooklyn Union Elevated R.R., 184 N. Y. 391,
77 N.E. 615 (1906); CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WIH THE LAND
89 (2d ed. 1947); 20 HAv. L. REv. 136 (1906). Contra, Cadwalader v. Bailey,
17 R. I. 495, 23 Atl. 20, 14 L.R.A. 300 (1891).
1. 92 F. Supp. 168 (W. D. Mo. 1950).
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The principal case is the first case in Missouri which specifically states tenants
by the entirety can convey property held by the entireties free of existing separate
debts. Whether or not this is logically and legally sound depends upon the nature
of a tenacy by the entirety at comon law and the effect of so-called married wom2
en's statutes upon such tenancy.
The conception of tenancy by entireties at common law, disregarding the husband's jure -axoris, was that the husband and wife took property conveyed to them
as one person, each holding the whole of it because they were in law one person,
one flesh and blood, a unity resulting from their marriage relation. a As a result
of this concept of the unity of the husband and wife, each spouse became owner of
the entire estate. Both were seized of the entirety and neither could sever the
union of interest without the assent of the other.4 Neither. husband nor wife had a
separate interest in the estate that could be aliened.r There could be no partition
of the estate and it was dissolved upon the disolution of the marriage.0 This pure
concept of tenancy by entirety was perverted by the husband's jure uxors.
The husband's jure uxoris was a marital right which gave him the absolute and
exclusive right of control, use and possession of the wife's property during cover,
ture.7 He had the power to do as he pleased with the wife's property in complete
disregard to her wishes, subject only to the possibility that she would outlive him.,
If the wife survived the husband, she resumed control over her property, but during
coverture the right to rents, profits, possession, use and control was in the husband. 9 The basis of this right was the idea that husband and wife were one, with
the wife being merged in the husband and he holding the rights of both.1o
2. For a case discussion of tenancy by the entirety and the effect of married
women's acts, cdmpai-e Stifel's Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S:W. 67
(1918) and Fairclaw v. Forrest, 130 F. 2d 829, 76 App. D. C. 197, 143 A.L.R.
1154 (1942), cert. deoied, 318 U. S. 756, (1942) witk Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N. Y.
306, 39 N.E. 337, 30 L.R.A. 305, 43 Am. St. Rep. 762 (1895) and Ganoe v. Ohmart,
121 Ore. 116, 254 Pac. 203 (1927). For a discussion of the disposition of property
held by the entireties when one spouse murders the other, see Note, 13 Mo. L. Rnv.
463 (1948). For a discussion of dower in estates by the entirety, see Note, 13
Mo. L. REv. 321 (1948).
3. Eg., Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 164 N.E. 613, 63 A.L.R. 231
(1929); Stifel's Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67 (1918); See Russell
v. Russell, 122 Mo. 235, 237, 26 S.W. 677 (1920).
4. Hurd v. Hughes, 12 Del. Ch. 188, 109 At. 418 (1920); Samuel v. Frederick, 262 S.W. 713 (Mo. 1924); See note 3 supra.
5. Sheldon v. Waters, 168 F. 2d 483 (C.C.A. 5th 1948); Blenard v. Blenard,
185 Md. 548, 45 A. 2d 335 (1945); See note 4 supra.
6. Russell v. Russell, 122 Mo. 235, 26 S.W. 677 (1894).
7. Stifel's Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67 (1918); 41 C.J.S.
§ 34, p. 462; See Amopolis Banking and Trust Co. v. Neilson, 164 Md. 8, 10, 164

Atl. 157, 158 (1933).
8. See, e.g., Licker v. Guskin, 265 Mass. 403, 407-408, 164 N.E. 613, 615,
63 A.L.R. 231, 234 (1929).
9. See e.g., Annapolis Banking and Trust Co. v. Neilson, 164 Md. 8, 11,
164 At. 157. 159 (1933).
10. Stifel's Brewing Co. v. Saxey, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67 (1918); See
Fairclaw v. Forrest, 130 F. 2d 829, 833, 76 App. D. C. 197, 143 A.L.R. 1154, 1159
(1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 756 (1942).
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The effect of jure uxoris upon a tenancy by the entirety at common law was
that the husband could convey the property to a third party, preventing the wife
from enjoying the possession and use of the property during their joint lives." If
the wife survived the husband, she, by the incident of survivorship, became entitled
to the property upon his death. Creditors of the husband could attach the rents
12
and profits of the land to the exdusion of the wife for satisfaction of his debts.
Married women's acts were passed in virtually every state to secure to the
married woman the enjoyment of her personal and real property.'3 The effect of
these acts upon tenants by entireties has not been uniform. Some jurisdictions held
the acts abolished tenancy by entireties. 14 Massachusetts held the acts were not applicable to tenants by the entirety. 15 Other jurisdictions, following the lead of New
York, held that a tenancy by the entirety under the act was an estate where neither
husband nor wife, without the assent of the other, could dispose of any part of the
estate so as to affect the right of survivorship in the other, and the husband and
wife were tenants in common as to the rents, profits, use and possession.' 6 Probably
in the majority of the jurisdictions in which tenancies by the entirety exist the
married women's acts abolished the husband's jure uxoris and raised the wife, in
the eyes of the law, to the same position as that of husband, thus entitling her to
take and hold property in her own right free from the control formerly exercised
7
by the husband.'
The effect of married women's acts on the rights of the separate creditors of the
spouses who hold property as tenants by the entirety has varied in accordance with
11. Fairclaw v. Forrest, supra note 10.
12. E.g., Raptes v. Passas, 259 Mass. 37, 155 N.E. 787 (1927); Hall v.
Stephens, 65 Mo. 670 (1877).
13. See e.g., Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N. Y. 306, 314, 39 N.E. 337, 339 (1895);
Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R. I. 453, 462, 25 A. 2d 354, 359, 141 A.L.R. 170, 177

(1942).
14. First National Bank of Birmingham v. Lawrence, 212 Ala. 45, 101 So.
663 (1924); Svan v. Walden, 156 Cal. 195, 103 Pac. 931 (1904); Whyman v.
Johnston, 62 Colo. 461, 163 Pac. 76 (1917); Lawler v. Byrne, 253 Ill. 194, 96 N.E.
892 (1911); Fay v. Smiley, 201 Ia. 1290, 207 N.W. 369 (1926); Appeal of Garland,
126 Me. 84, 136 At. 459 (1927); Semper v. Coates, 93 Minn. 76, 100 N.W. 662
(1904); Helvis v. Hoover, 11 Okla. 687, 69 Pac. 958 (1902), McNeeley v. South
Penn. Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 616, 44 S.E. 508 (1903); Perrigo v. Richardson's Estate,
229 Wis. 426, 282 N.W. 585 (1938).
15. See e.g., Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 407, 164 N.E. 613, 615, 63:
A.L.R. 231 (1929).
16. Branch v. Polk, 61 Ark. 388, 33 S.W. 424 (1895); Hiles v. Fisher, 144
N. Y. 306, 39 N.E. 337 (1895); Zanzomio v. Lanzonico, 24 N.J. Misc. 153, 46 A.
2d 565, 166 A.L.R. 964 (1946); Ganoe Iv. Ohmart, 121 Ore. 116, 254 Pac. 203
(1927).
17. U. S. v. Nathanson, 60 F. Supp. 193 (E. D. Mich. 1945); Fairclaw v.
Forrest, 130 F. 2d 829, 76 App. D. C. 197, 143 A.L.R. 1154 (1942), cert. denied, 318
U. S. 756 (1943); Hurd v. Hughes, 12 Del. Ch. 188, 109 Atl. 418 (1920); Ohio
Butterine Co. v. Hargrove, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 C1920); Chandler v. Cheney,
37 Ind. 391 (1871); Annapolis Banking and Trust Co. v. Neilson, 164 Md. 8, 164
Atl. 157 (1933); Stifel's Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67 (1918);
Beihl v. Martin, 236 Pa. 519, 84 At. 9.53, 42 L.R.S. (N. S.) 555 (1912); Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R. I. 453, 25 A. 2d 354 (1942).
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the different interpretations placed upon the act by various jurisdictions. In Massachusetts because married women's acts are not applicable to tenancy by the entirety, the situation is the same as at common law. The husband has the right to
possession use, rents and profits during coverture, which may be subjected to the
rights of creditors. The husband may convey the property subject to the right of
the wife's survivorship but the wife can not convey her interest nor subject her
interest to the claims of her creditors.18
In New York and jurisdictions which follow the New York view, creditors of
the husband may subject his interest to attachment and sale.19 The purchaser of
the husband's interest in such a case becomes a tenant in common with the wife,
entitled to an undivided one-half interest in the possession and use of the premises
including the residence, during the wife's lifetime, and to the fee of the whole if
the husband survives the wife. 20 If the wife survives the purchaser, she, by the incident of survivorship, takes the fee. The basis of this rule has been stated to be that
the married women's acts were to give the wife the right to control and convey her
property and not to give her the right to control the husband's interest.21 In these
jurisdictions the husband and wife could not convey free of the rights of separate
22
creditors of either spouse.
In jurisdictions where the effect of the acts have been to abolish the husband's
jure oxoris, raising the wife to be his equal in the eyes of the law, creditors of the
husband or wife alone are denied access to property held as tenants by the entirety, 23
the reason being that neither spouse is considered as having any separate interest
in an estate by the entireties which is subject to attachment or. levy.24 These jurisdictions have reasserted and perfected the common law conception of a tenancy by
the entirety without the modifying effects of the husband's jure uxoris. Likewise
the income, use and possession of the estate by the entirety is also exempt from
25
the reach of the separate creditors of the husband and wife.
The reasoning behind these decisions is based upon the proposition that the
married women acts were enacted to prevent the husband from depriving the wifo
of the right of enjoyment and use of her property. Thus to permit the husband's
creditors to levy upon and sell the husband's interest in the property would not be

18. Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 164 N.E. 613, 63 A.L.R. 231 (1929).
19. Moore v. Denson, 167 Ark. 134, 268 S.W. 609 (1924). See note 16 nrpra.
20. Cf., Infante v. Sperber, 187 Misc. 9, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 76 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
21. See Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N. Y. 306, 315, 39 N.E. 337, 339 (1895); Ganoe
v. Ohmart, 121 Ore. 116, 121, 254 Pac. 203, 205 (1927).
22. Finnegan v. Humes, 252 App. Div. 385, 299 N. Y. Supp. 501 (4th Dep't
1937); aff'd, 277 N. Y. 682, 14 N.E. 2d 389, Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N. Y. 306, 39 N.E.
337 (1895).
23. Bloomfield v. BroWn, 67 R. I. 453, 25 A. 2d 354, 141 A.L.R. 170 (1942);
See Brinker v. Brinker, 227 S.W. 2d 724, 728 (Mo. 19$0).
24. See note 5 spra.

25. Lomax v. Cramer, 202 Mo. App. 365, 216 S.W. 575 (1919); Kingman v.
Banks, 212 Mo. App. 202, 251 S.W. 499 (1923).
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giving effect to the acts for it would deprive the wife of the enjoyment of her property the same as if the husband had conveyed it to a stranger. 2
In these jurisdictions creditors of the debtor's spouse have advanced two contentions against the rule preventing them from reaching the debtor's interest in the
tenancy .by the entirety, namely, that to withhold the debtor's interest from them
is to deny them their rights, and that the debtor spouse can defraud his creditor
by creating a tenancy by the entirety. The courts have answered the first contention by declaring that if the debt existed before the creation of the tenancy by
the entirety, the property was not the basis for the credit extension, and if the debt
arose after the tenancy existed, the creditor is presumed to have notice of the character of the estate which limits his right to reach it;27 or that the only rights that
the creditors have are those given them by the law and the law gives them no right
to take the wife's property for the husband's debts. 28 In answer to the second contention, the courts have stated that if a tenancy by the entirety is created for such
9
a purpose it can be set aside as fraudulent.2
Missouri adopted the majority view in Stife's Brewing Co. v. Saxy. 30 There,
H and W held realty as tenants by the entirety. H became indebted to the plaintiff.
Then H transferred his interest to W; she sold the property and with the proceeds
purchased the present property in her own name. Plaintiff had obtained a judgment
against H, and sought to subject, to the satisfaction of his judgment, the property
purchased with the proceeds from the sale of the estate held by the entireties at the
time H incurred the debt. The court held that a tenancy by the entirety could not
be held for the individual debts of H saying, "where a judgment and execution
thereon are against a husband alone . . . such judgment and execution cannot affect in any way property held by the entirety, nor can it affect any supposed separate interest of the husband therein, for he has no separate interest." (emphasis
tidded). Development of the law on tenants by the entirety in Missouri since this
decision has been consistent with it.
In Samuels v. Fredrick,31 H gave X a blank deed which H had signed authorizing X to sell property owned by H and W as tenants by the entirety. W told X
the property was not for sale. H and W moved to California. X sold the property
and forged W's signature. The court held the deed was void, because neither H nor
W could convey any interest in a tenancy by the entirety without the consent of
the other.
In Goldberg Plwmbing Co. v. Taylor,3 2 plaintiff sued to enforce a mechanic's
lien. Against the wishes of W, H had a heating unit installed in their home owned
26. E.g., Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind. 391 (1871); Stifel's Brewing Co. v.
Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67 (1918).
27. Hurd v. Hughes, 12 Del. Ch. 188, 109 At. 418 (1920).
28. Annapolis Banking and Trust Co. v. Neilson, 164 Md. 8, 164 At. 157

(1933).
29.
30.
31.
32.

Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hargrave, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920).
273 Mo. 159, 201 S.W. 67 (1918).
262 S.W. 713 (Mo. 1924).
209 Mo. App. 98, 227 S.W. 900 (1922).
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by the entireties. The court held H had no interest in a tenancy by the entirety that
could be subjected to a mechanic's lien.
Plaintiff tried to garnish rents from property held by the entirety to satisfy
H's separate debts in Kirgman v. Banks.a3 The court held that rents and profits of
a tenancy by the entireties were not subject to attachment for the debts of 9
alone.
H's attorney filed a lien for attorney's fees upon a $750 insurance settlement resulting from a fire on property held by the entireties, in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v,
Bleedorn.34 The court held that neither spouse had the power to subject an estate
by the entireties to a lien.
It seems clear that an estate by the entireties is not subject to a lien for the
separate debt of either spouse in Missouri.
Jurisdictions which give the same interpretation to married women's acts as
Missouri, with the exception of Pennsylvania, have uniformly held that creditors of
either H or W alone can not have a lien against an estate by the entireties.
Pennsylvania, following the decision in Biehl v. Martin,85 holds that the expectancy of survivorship of either spouse may be the subject of a lien, but this lien
is enforceable only when the expectancy ripens into a realized fact and it may be
extinguished by the alienation of the estate by the joint act of H and W, or by the
predecease of the debtor.
In the principal case, the government's contention was based upon the theory
that the expectancy of survivorship was a right to property of H within the meaning
of the statute and therefore subject to an income tax lien. This contention was also
advanced by the government in Shaw v. U.S., s6 where the United States asserted
a lien on property held by the entirety, for taxes which were assessed against H
individually. The court rejected the government's claim for a lien on the property
stating that a tenancy by the entirety was not subject to a lien in Michigan. 7
If the government's contention had been upheld, it would have been in contradiction to the expressed language of the court in Stifel's Brewing Co. v. Saxy.
The subject of the lien for which the government contended could only have been
the bare expectancy of survivorship in H. Because the expectancy of survivorship
in either spouse may be destroyed either by a joint mutual conveyance by H and W
or by death, it follows that the government's contention for a lien was invalid, because the subject of the lien had been destroyed by the conveyance from H and IF
to the straw party. It is submitted that the decision in the principal case is logically
sound and a step further in pronouncing the law on tenants by the entirety consistent with the development of the theory and reasoning of such law in Missouri.
ROBERT P. KELLY
33. 212 Mo. App. 202, 251 S.W. 449 (1923); Lomax v. Cramer, 202 Mo.
App. 365, 216 S.W. 575 (1919) (personalty may be held as tenants by the
entirety).
34. 235 Mo. App. 286,132 S.W. 2d 1066 (1939).
35. 236 Pa. 519, 84 At. 953, 42 L.R.S. (N. S.) 555 (1912).
36. 94 F. Supp. 245 (W. D. Mich. 1939) [first published 19511
37. Cf. U. S. v. Nathanson, 60 F. Supp. 193 (E. D. Mich. 1945).
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ToRTs-LIABILITY OF AN OCCUPIER OF LAND TO A BUSINESS VIsrroR INJURED
BY

AcTS

OF AN INDEPENDENT THIRD PERSON

Hughes v. St. Louis National League Baseball Club"
The plaintiff stepped from the grandstand at Sportsman's Park in St. Louis
after a baseball game. She had taken about three steps toward a playing field exit
when a boy engaged in "horseplay" with other boys ran into her, causing plaintiff
to fall and break her arm. This boy was one of a group of eight to ten boys.
allowed on the field following games to secure employment picking up seat cushions.
Respondeat superior was not pleaded, but the plaintiff based her case on the
alleged negligence of the defendant in not warning the plaintiff of the dangerous
condition created by the conduct of the boys or in not taking steps to correct it.
The Supreme Court of Missouri remanded the case because of failure to instruct
the jury that the defendant must have known, or had reasonable opportunity to
know, that the boys were creating a dangerous condition before a duty on defendants part would arise to warn or make safe.
The general liability of an occupier of land is ordinary care under the circumstances to prevent injury to his "business invitees." 2 This liability includes affirmative acts of negligence and also dangerous conditions which the defendant could have
known of in the exercise of ordinary care. The rule of ordinary care applies alike
to the private occupier and the occupier of land held out to the public; 3 but because of factors such as the conduct of patrons, the business conducted the benefit bestowed by patrons, and the public character. of the enterprise, liability is broader
where the occupier invites the public. 4 Because of this broader liability where a pub1. 359 Mo. 993, 224 S.W.2d 989 (1949), reversing 218 S.W. 2d 632 (Mo. App.

1949).
2. Porchey v. Kelling, 353 Mo. 1034, 185 S.W.2d 820 (1945); Stevenson v.
K.C. Southern Ry., 348 Mo. 1216, 159 S.W.2d 260 (1941); Paubel v. Hitz, 339 Mo.
274, 96 S.W.2d 369 (1936); Glaser v. Rothschild, 222 Mo. 180, 120 S.W. 1 (1909);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 343 (1934): "A possessor of land is subject to liability for
bodily harm caused to business visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereon
if, but only if, he
(a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover, the condition
which, if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk
to them, and
(b) has no reason to believe that they will discover the condition or realize the
risk involved therein, and
(c) invites or permits them to enter or remain upon the land without exercising reasonable care
(i) to make the condition reasonably safe, or.
(ii) to give a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm without
relinquishing any of the services which they are entitled to receive,
if the posssesor is a public utility."
3. Anderson v. K. C. Baseball Club, 231 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1950); Hudson v.
K. C. Baseball Club, 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W.2d 318 (1942); Berberet v. Electric
Park Amusement Co., 319 Mo. 275, 3 S.W.2d 1025 (1928); 52 AM. JUR., Theaters,
Shows, Exhibitions & Public Resorts, § 44 (1936).
4. Klaman v. Hitchcock, 181 Minn. 109, 231 N.W. 716 (1930); Hudson v.'
K. C. Baseball Club, 349 Mo. 1215, 164 S.W.2d 318 (1942); Paubel v. Hitz, 339 Mo.
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lic utility or other possessor of land holds land out to the public for entry for business purposes, a dangerous condition may include the acts of third persons.5 Such a
doctrine does not appear to be applicable to the private occupier inasmuch as tile
reported cases deal exclusively with lands held out to the public.
The occupier who holds land out to the public for entry as business patrons
is definitely not an insurer," but his liability is predicated on his knowledge, either
actual or constructive, of the conduct creating the dangerous condition. The relationship between the occupier and the third person, if not constituting a basis
for respon'deat superior, is therefore immaterial; and he may be a person outside
the premises, 7 an invitee,s an employee outside the scope of employment, 9 a
licensee,' 0 or a trespasser. 1 Defendant has been held to know, or to have had
reasonable opportunity to know of the conduct, in these fact situations: employees
off duty playing ball,1 2 boys playing on a high board at defendant's swimming pool,' 3
boys shooting into theatre with "BB" guns,1 4 a drunk patron pushing people at a
skating rink,' 5 a wrestler thrown from the ring by his opponent, l0 and a jitterbugging marine.Y7 Defendant has been found not to know of the condition in the
exercise of reasonable care, and therefore not liable, in these fact situations: a

274, 96 S.W.2d 369 (1936) (This case describes the degrees of ordinary care at page
282: "Generally speaking, the legal duties imposed on the possessor increase or decrease with the beneficial interest of the possessor in the presence of the other on
the premises; and, as a corrollary, corresponding shifts occur in the legal rights of
the party on the premises."); Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 319 Mo.
275, 3 S.W.2d 1025 (1928); Fimple v. Archer Ballroom Co., 150 Neb. 681, 35 N.W.2d
680 (1949); See Note, 98 A.L.R. 558 (1935).
5. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 348 (1934): "A public utility or other possessor
of land who holds it out to the public for entry for his business purposes is subjectl
to liability to members of the public while upon the land for such a purpose for bodily
harm caused to them by the accidental, negligent or intentional harmful acts of third
persons or animals if the possessor by the exercise of reasonable care could have
(a) discovered that such acts were being done or were about to be done, and
(b) protected the members of the public by
(i) controlling the conduct of the third persons, or
(ii) giving a warning adequate to enable them to avoid the harm without
relinquishing any of the services to which they are entitled to receive
from a public utility."
6. Klaman v. Hitchcock, 181 Minn. 109, 231 N.W. 716 (1930); Berberet v.
Electric Park Amusement Co., 319 Mo. 275, 3 S.W.2d 1025 (1928); Fimple v. Archer
Ballroom Co., 150 Neb. 681, 35 N.W.2d 680 (1949); See Note, 142 A.L.R. 868
(1943).
7. Central Theatres, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 154 Fla. 589, 18 So. 2d 755 (1944).
8. Murphy v. Winter Gardens & Ice Co., 280 S. W. 444 (Mo. App. 1926).
9. Easier. v. Downie Amusement Co., 125 Me. 334, 133 At. 905 (1926).
10. Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 27 Cal. 2d 802, 167 P. 2d 729 (1942).
11. Brodie v. Miller, 24 Tenn. App. 316, 143 S.W. 2d 1042 (1940).
12. Easier v. Downie Amusement Co., 125 Me. 334, 133 At]. 905 (1926).
13. Hill v. Merrick, 147 Ore. 244, 31 P.2d 663 (1934).
14. Central Theatres, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 154 Fla. 589, 18 So.2d 755 (1944).
15. Martin v. Philadelphia Gardens, Inc., 348 Pa. 232, 35 A.2d 317 (1944).
16. Duskiewiez v. Carter, 52 A.2d 788, 115 Vt. 122 (1947).
17. Edwards v. Hollywood Canteen, 27 Cal.2d 802, 167 P.2d 729 (1946).
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shooting in defendant's amusement hall,' a wrestler jumping from the ring,19 a
patron pushed down by a crowd, 20 a crowd in a store, 2 ' and boys pushing a lin22
oleum over onto plaintiff.
The principal case recognized the duty of an occupier of land to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to his "invitee,,' and that this duty, in the case of an
occupier holding his land out to the public for business purposes, includes preventing
injury to the "invitee" by third persons, whose conduct the defendant knows or
should know is creating a "dangerous condition."
WILLIAM W.

SHINN

TORTs-NEGLIGENCE-ILLEGAL PARKING-OBsTRUCTING THE VISION OF
ONCOMING TRAFFIC

Domitz v. Springfield Bottlers, Inc.'
Two trailers belonging to the defendant bottling corporation were parked at
the southwest corner of the intersection of two streets which crossed at right angles.
The trailers were parked so close to the corner as to violate (decided by way of dictum) the following Joplin ordinance: ". . . No vehicle shall so occupy any street
so as to unnecessarily interfere with or interrupt the free passage of other vehicles
or hold up traffic." While the trailers were so parked, two cars approaching each
other at right angles reached the intersection simultaneously and, to avoid colliding,
both drivers veered, one of whom struck the plaintiff as she was stepping up to
the curb at the northwestern corner of the intersection, causing serious injuries. She
brought this suit against the driver of the car which struck her and the defendant
corporation. The trial court dismissed the suit against the defendant corporation
as showing no cause of action and Mrs. Domitz appealed. The supreme court reversed the judgment and remanded the case, holding that there were facts sufficient
to go to the jury on the theory of common law negligence.
It is a frequent irritation with the urban motorist to have otherwise clear intersections made blind by vehicles parking too near the corner. And that there is
a real danger from such parking is demonstrated by this and many other cases.
Many cities have recognized this danger by prohibiting parking near the corner
of intersections.
The problem of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff is passed over
briefly; after a short discussion the court concludes the subject by observing, "It
is common knowledge that 'blind' intersections are points of danger for the traveling
public." However, both cases cited by the court in support of this conclusion relied
18. Brodie v. Miller, 24 Tenn. App. 316, 143 S.W.2d 1042 (1940).
19. Wiersma v. City of Long Beach, 41 Cal. App.2d 8, 106 P.2d 45 (1940).
20. Master v. Alsina, 15 So.2d 660 (La. App., 1943). Compare Tuttle v.
Kline's, Inc., 230 Mo. App. 230, 89 S.W.2d 675 (1935) with Myers v. K. C. Junior
Orpheum, 228 Mo. App. 840, 73 S.W.2d 313 (1934).
21. F. W. Woolworth & Company v. Conboy, 170 Fed. 934 (C.C.A. 8th 1909).
22. Noonan v. Sheridan, 230 Ky. 162, 18 S.W.2d 976 (1929).
1. 359 Mo. 412, 221 S.W.2d 831 (1949).
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solely on violation of parking ordinances for duty and breach,2 rather than basing
their decisions on a common law duty, as in the instant case. In fact, nearly all of
these cases substitute violation of an ordinance in place of working out common law
negligence,3 though the general tenor is that use of the ordinance merely facilitates
solving the duty problem and does not exclude application of common law principles
of duty and breach. 4
The "question is then, were the actions of Flynn and Mink in driving their cars
into the intersection ... such independent acts or causes as to render the negligence
of the defendant company remote?"'' It is the question of causation which mostly
concerns this and other courts when faced with cases of this type. Most courts assert
that the act of the driver who actually strikes the plaintiff is intervening and independent, but go on to say that the driver of the parked vehicle which obstructed
the party's vision could foresee such danger and hence there is proximate cause.0
The broad basis for decisions which refuse to hold the owner of the parked
vehicle liable is also causation; such cases hold that the obstruction caused by the
defendant's parked vehicle is a condition and not a cause of the subsequent accldent.7 It appears then, that while no courts have trouble holding that there is a
duty owed--either from common law foreseeability, statutory violation, or boththe few cases that do deny liability do so on the broad ground of causation.
Twice in the principal case there is mentioned the possibility of a hitherto
vaguely recognized idea perhaps best described as the exception of reasonable

necessity. That exception may be stated as follows: Whenever a driver parks his
vehicle in such a way as to block the vision of an oncoming car or pedestrian, or
both, and an accident ensues from such blocking of vision, then the driver of the
2. Millbury v. Turner Center System, 274 Mass. 358, 174 N.E. 471 (1931);
Kuba v. Nagel, 124 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. 1939).
3. Whelan v. Bigelow, 33 Cal. App.2d 717, 92 P.2d 952 (1939); Winsky v.
DeMandel, 204 Cal. 107, 266 Pac. 534 (1928); Millbury v. Turner Center System,
supra, n. 2 (leading case in this general field); Kuba v. Nagel, supra, n. 2; Marchl
v. Dowling, 157 Pa. Sup. 91, 41 A.2d 427 (1945); Taber v. Bauer, 173 Wash. 96,
21 P.2d 1028 (1933).
4. McKay v. Hedger, 149 Cal. App. 266, 34 P.2d 221 (1934); Reliable Transfer Co. v. May, 70 Ga. App. 613, 29 S.E.2d 187 (1944); Williams v. Grier, 68 Ga.
App. 863, 26 S.E.2d 698 (1943); these first three cases find negligence under the
ordinance, but go on to indicate that common law negligence is also present. However, in Hansen v. Houston Elec. Co., 41 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1931), a duty was found
solely on common law grounds of foreseeability of the risk-but there was no applicable ordinance.
5. Instant case, 359 Mo. at 415.
6. RESTATEMENT, ToTS § 447 (1934); Whelan v. Bigelow, supra, n. 3; McKay v. Hedger, stepra, n. 4; Winsky v. DeMandel, supra, n. 3; Reliable Transfer
Co. v. May, supra, n. 4; Williams v. Grier, supra, n. 4; Blessing v. Welding, 266 Ia.
1178, 286 N.W. 436 (1939); Brey v. Rosenfeld, 50 A.2d 911 (Me. 1947).
7. Pullen v. Ga. Stages, Inc., 62 Ga. App. 592, 9 S.E.2d 104 (1940); Cain v.
Ga. Power Co., 53 Ga. App. 483, 186 S.E. 229 (1936); Baker v. Cities Serv. Oil Co.,
321 11. App. 142, 52 N.E.2d 284 (1943); Walker v. Ill. Com. Tel. Co., 315 Il. A pp.
553, 43 N.E.2d 412 (1942); Powers v. Standard Oil Co., 98 N. J. Lav 730, 119 Atl.
273 (1923).
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parked vehicle will be liable for resulting injuries, unless there is a reasonable necessity for parking such vehicle at that particular place. This exception seems to
furnish the underlying explanation for most or all of the cases seemingly contra to
the majority holdings;" at least there are various innuendoes to that effect in several
of the decided cases. 9
THOMAS B. MOORE

8. Cain v. Ga. Power Co., supra, n. 7 (bus stopping at a regular bus stop);
Baker v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., supra, n. 7 (truck unloading gasoline); Walker v. Ill.
Com. Tel. Co., supra, n. 7 (truck unloading telephone poles); Powers v. Standard
Oil Co., supr-, n. 7 (truck unloading gasoline); Galuppi v. City of Youngstown, 55
0. App. 331, 9 N.E.2d 739 (1936) (city water truck actually in use); Brey v. Rosenfeld, 72 R.I. 28, 48 A.2d 177 (1946) (truck unloading cement).
9. Galuppi v. City of Youngstown, supra, n. 8 (in denying that use of water
truck was a nuisance); Brey v. Rosenfeld, supra, n. 8 (". . . whether defendant was
making a reasonable and necessary use of the sidewalk . . ." Defendant was parked

on sidewalk unloading cement);Hansen v. Houston Elec. Co., .pra, n. 4 (not a
regular bus stop); Taber v. Bauer, supra, n. 3 (focal point of decision apparently
was whether or not parking of truck in that location was reasonably necessary).
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